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UTILIZATION OF NAVY SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL IN DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT COMMAND UNITS

by

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Faced with a continually shrinking defense budget it has become increasingly important to fully employ all resources available. The reserves represent one resource that can be exploited further in this quest for efficiency. This thesis focuses on the utilization of the Naval Selected Reserves affiliated with the Defense Contract Management Command. The objective was to examine how these units are currently employed, and how they might be used more effectively in the future. Ancillary issues such as a structured reserve acquisition career path and the impact of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) were also raised. The most important conclusion derived from this research is that the reserve acquisition forces represent a vast array skills and experience, and that these forces can be most effectively utilized when their civilian-based skills are drawn upon and employed. Additionally, it became readily apparent that the non-productive drains upon the reservists' time must be eliminated or streamlined. Finally, the issue of applying DAWIA to the reserve forces is currently undecided, but consensus recommends again any formal application.

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ABSTRACT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A. BACKGROUND 1

B. OBJECTIVES 3

C. RESEARCH QUESTION 6

D. SCOPE 7

E. METHODOLOGY 8

F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 10

G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 13

II. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND METHODOLOGY . . 15

A. BACKGROUND 15

B. LITERATURE REVIEW 25

1. DAWIA 25

a. Legislative Background 25

b. Applicability to Reservists 28

2. DLA, DCMC, and Contributory Support 30

C. METHODOLOGY 34

III. PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED 36

A. SELRES QUESTIONNAIRES 38

B. GAINING COMMAND QUESTIONNAIRES 56

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IV. DATA ANALYSIS/INTERPRETATION 66

A. UNIT PERSONNEL 67

B. PRESENT UTILIZATION 70

C. FUTURE UTILIZATION 74

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 79

A. CONCLUSIONS 79

B. RECOMMENDATIONS 82

C. SUMMARY 85

1. Primary Research Question. 85

2. Subsidiary Research Questions. 86

D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 89

APPENDIX A 92

APPENDIX B 101

APPENDIX C 105

BIBLIOGRAPHY 109

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 112

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Operating in today's defense environment, characterized by uncertainty, a rapidly shrinking budget, and a leaner force structure, it has become increasingly important that the Military Services effectively utilize all of the scarce resources at their disposal to the maximum extent possible. The reserve elements of the armed forces provide various opportunities for achieving greater economies. By providing the active forces with professional contributory support, while simultaneously training for specific mobilization billets, the reserve forces comprise an asset that can be effectively used to fill emergent needs or offset chronic manpower or skills shortages. Ensuring that reserve elements are fully capable of integrating into, and operating with, their active duty counterparts is crucial in realizing efficient, effective utilization of all available resources.

While reserve forces are represented, and participate, in virtually every professional field and specialty found within the Navy, some elements are currently under greater scrutiny and are being reevaluated in light of the experiences of Desert Shield/Storm. Top management within the Navy is examining the various active and reserve elements with respect

to their proper place in the future Navy and Naval Reserve. Some elements, because of the specific nature of their missions, will be an easy sell; others will have to demonstrate that they are a necessary and valuable asset not only in war, but also in peacetime.

Naval Reservists serving in acquisition[1] related billets are currently in this situation. The experiences of Desert Shield/Storm demonstrate that it will probably take a more extensive, and/or longer mobilization effort before significant numbers of reserve acquisition personnel will be needed to support increased logistics volumes. This isn't to say that a reserve capability probably won't be needed and shouldn't be maintained, but that the emphasis can be more logically focused towards the value-adding support reservists can provide today, in peacetime, rather than training for, and justifying existence solely on, wartime mobilization billets. Naval Reservists have long applied their sometimes extensive active duty experience and varied civilian business backgrounds to make meaningful and significant contributions to the accomplishment of their gaining command's primary mission. Contributory support takes many forms and varies greatly from command to command.

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[1]The term "acquisition" will be used throughout this thesis for simplicity, and is intended to include all facets of the process including: planning, production, contracting, contract administration, logistics support, and other commonly categorized fields.

Despite the value and practicality of contributory support, all reserve units must continue training for their mobilization billets. Under the umbrella of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), the scope of reservist billet qualification requirements may change. Depending upon how this act is applied to the Naval Reserve, reserve units participating in acquisition related fields will either continue to drill and maintain the status quo, cease to exist entirely, or prosper in a somewhat modified structure. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), along with the respective Military Services, is currently investigating this very issue. Regardless of the outcome of their investigations into the applicability of DAWIA, these agencies must also determine how to most effectively use the reserve assets they currently possess, or make the difficult and potentially costly decision to terminate reserve participation.

B. OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of this thesis is to examine various ways in which Naval Reservists involved in the acquisition process can be more effectively utilized. While reservists are currently serving at a variety of commands involved in the acquisition process, this thesis will concentrate on those affiliated with the Defense Contract Management Command. This examination will be made with consideration of the potential impact of DAWIA. Although a formal determination of the Act's

applicability to reservists has not been made, any analysis of reserve force utilization must address the Act's requirements and its potential impact upon the Naval Reserve participants.

In preparation for the previously discussed analysis, this researcher intends to examine the various ways in which Naval Reservists have been, and are currently being, utilized at the various DCMC affiliated units. Despite operating under essentially identical mobilization training requirements, no two units are alike in the type and scope of contributory support they provide their respective gaining commands. However, investigating past and current utilization of all units involved will reveal basic evolutionary trends and patterns in support of the most likely and desirable future utilization.

A supporting objective of this thesis is to compile a detailed skills profile of the reservists currently serving in DCMC affiliated units. The profiles will address applicable active duty, reserve, and civilian experiences in acquisition, contracting, or related fields, and will also assess the item-by-item accomplishment of specific DAWIA qualification requirements pertaining to Levels I through III. These data will facilitate generating recommendations and conclusions concerning the possible impact of the reserve application of DAWIA, and will aid in assessing the suitability of various utilization options presented.

After examining the most effective utilization techniques in light of the potential impact of DAWIA, this thesis will investigate the desirability of a defined and stable career path for reservists involved in acquisition. Currently, Naval Reserve selection boards (for Supply Corps officers) tend to place emphasis on a varied career background favoring selection of those who are considered generalists. Spending too much time in one type of reserve unit is looked upon as limiting to an officer's development as he/she progresses towards senior management positions, and may adversely affect promotion opportunities. Many feel that the acquisition specialist requires years to become fully qualified, unless the officer is fortunate enough to have had significant prior experience and formal training. This opinion is supported by the magnitude of the traditional acquisition field qualification requirements, and the experience and training requirements that will be levied under DAWIA with its intent to form a stable, professional acquisition workforce with a defined career path. Since many reserve activities and qualification requirements parallel active duty, it seems only natural to look at an acquisition career path designed especially for Naval Reservists. A career path that incorporates the requirements for serving not only in DCMC affiliated units, but other units involved in the acquisition process, could broaden career opportunities while providing a professional corps of acquisition officers.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

The primary research question that will be addressed in this study is: "What is the most effective way in which Navy Selected Reserve personnel can be utilized in Defense Contract Management Command reserve units?" Subsidiary considerations addressed in support of this question include the following:

- To what extent are Selected Reserve personnel currently being utilized in DCMC reserve units?
- What functions can Selected Reserve personnel perform that they are not currently performing?
- How will the mandatory training requirements in Department of Defense Directive 5000.52, Subj: Defense Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development Program, impact the Selected Reservists' ability to fully qualify for their positions and perform in these billets in the future?
- What is the impact of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) on the designation of acquisition billets in the Selected Reserves?
- Do the present training and career paths within the DCMC units fulfill qualification requirements of other reserve acquisition billets?
- Are there adequate controls in place to prevent conflicts of interest between civilian employment and the individuals duties at the DCMC units?

D. SCOPE

This thesis is a compilation of the experiences and opinions of the Selected Reservists (SELRES) currently serving in DCMC affiliated reserve units, along with those of their active duty/civilian counterparts. Only Naval Reservists and their primary counterparts were queried in this study. The main reason for this narrow sampling is the fact that the Navy is the only Service that maintains formal reserve unit structures at each Defense Contract Management District (DCMD) office and the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) itself. The other Services' reservists drill as Independent Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) at these offices. A secondary reason is that each of the 11 Naval Reserve units are similarly structured and manned allowing a comparison of opinions and skills profiles based on a similar training, experience, and structural baseline. Including other Services would require establishing a different training, experience, and billet structure baseline for each particular Service. Conclusions and recommendations made concerning the utilization of the Naval Reserve units may or may not be appropriate for the other Services.

The scope of this study focuses on the most effective future utilization of Naval Reservists as seen from the individual reservist's perspective. Analysis will be supported by their past and current duties performed, and the present experience and skills profiles of each queried

officer. Official viewpoint is incorporated when germane, and will be a guiding factor in assessing the viability of the recommendations.

A significant limitation encountered concerns the currently undecided future applicability of DAWIA qualification requirements to reservists, and the question of whether or not any reserve billets will be designated as part of the acquisition workforce. Regardless of the applicability of DAWIA to the peacetime reservist, one must consider the possible scenarios that could occur should mobilization become a reality. How will DAWIA be applied to not only reservists, but the acquisition workforce in general, as acquisition commands increase manpower to meet mobilization and surge requirements generated by a major conflict? Any conclusions or recommendations made must include consideration of the impact of these decisions.

E. METHODOLOGY

This study is based on three sources of information: questionnaires completed by Naval Reservists and their primary gaining command counterparts, interviews with subject area experts, and various internal documents, instructions, letters, and point papers. The questionnaires were used as the primary source of data for this study as this researcher felt that the individual reserve officers actively working in the reserve units were the best source of information for

examining future utilization possibilities. These officers are well aware of not only their own skills and experience, but also the conditions and constraints under which they must work. Therefore, they should know better than anyone what they are capable of accomplishing given the opportunity. Interviews and literature reviews were used as secondary sources of information in an effort to ascertain the current status of DAWIA applicability, and to provide historical data and insight into various aspects of the primary and subsidiary research questions.

The questionnaire used as the basis for this thesis is included as Appendix A. The questionnaire consists of three parts. Part 1 solicited general information about the reservist such as his/her civilian occupation, mobilization billet, and years of experience. Part 2 asks for the individual's experiences in the acquisition field, the types of duties currently performed, the types of duties the individual is not performing but feels qualified to perform, and other concerns they may have. Part 3 forms a detailed qualification profile in terms of DAWIA requirements for Levels I through III. The questionnaire was forwarded to all 11 DCMC affiliated units, representing approximately 125 officers in total. Each officer was given a companion questionnaire (Appendix B) to be completed by the primary active duty military or civilian counterpart with whom he/she interacts. The questionnaire is similar to the reserve

officer questionnaire in its Parts 1 and 2, but does not ask for a DAWIA certification profile. The results of these questionnaires will be presented in Chapter III and analyzed in Chapter IV.

Interviews were conducted with a variety of officers, reserve and active duty, involved in acquisition and/or reserve manpower management. These interviews were intended to provide insight, differing views, and direction for this study, and highlighted much of the ongoing activities currently focusing on the future roles of Naval Reservists.

There is very little general literature on this subject; however, several position papers, letters, and memorandum do exist that express or guide official decisions and unofficial opinions. This information is included where applicable to contrast or support the opinions of the SELRES responders, and will be considered in any recommendations made.

F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

To facilitate the reading of this thesis for those who may not be familiar with certain aspects of the Naval Reserve or the acquisition process, common terms and acronyms are defined below:

Acquisition Corps - A component of the acquisition workforce composed of selected personnel in the military grades of O-4 and above, and civilian grades of GS/GM-13 and

above. Each Service has one Acquisition Corps as does the Department of Defense (DODM 5000.52M, 1991).

Acquisition Position - Billets (civilian or military) having acquisition duties and falling under an acquisition category as established by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) (USD(A)). These billets are not necessarily located in organizations conducting acquisition as their primary mission (DODM 5000.52M, 1991).

Acquisition Workforce - All permanent military and civilian personnel who are occupying acquisition positions, are members of an Acquisition Corps, or are in acquisition related programs (DODM 5000.52M, 1991).

Critical Acquisition Position - Senior positions, as designated by the Secretary of Defense, with significant responsibilities in the Department of Defense acquisition system. Any acquisition position requiring a GS/GM-14 or above, or an O-5 or above, is considered critical (DODM 5000.52M, 1991).

Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) - Included in the Defense Authorization Act of FY 1991, Public Law 101-510, as Title XII, this Act requires the establishment and uniform implementation of policies and procedures for the effective management of personnel serving in acquisition positions.

Gaining Command - The active military or DoD organization that manages the reserve unit's mobilization billets and

establishes training requirements. Reserve units are generally named after the gaining command and perform at least a portion of their training requirement at the command itself.

GS-1102 (Contracting) - Occupational series which includes Contract Negotiator, Contract Specialist, Contract Termination Specialist, Contract Administrator, Procurement Analyst, Administrative Contracting Officer, Contract Price/Cost Analyst, Contracting Officer, Procuring Contracting Officer, and Termination Contracting Officer (DODM 5000.52M, 1991).

Individual Training Plan (ITP) - An individualized planning document which lists specific mobilization billet training requirements and tracks accomplishment. Examples are included as Appendix C.

Mobilization Billet - The specific billet an individual reservist trains for, and can be expected to fill, in the event of recall or mobilization.

Selected Reserve (SELRES) - Reservists in a drill pay status, generally participating in 4 monthly drills and 2 weeks annual active duty for training. SELRES are considered trained, equipped, and prepared for immediate recall upon completing their mobilization billet qualification requirements.

G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

The remaining chapters of this study are as follows:

Chapter II: BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter will present a brief history of the reserve concept in general, a more detailed look at the Naval Reserves, and background on how these forces evolved into their present structure. It will then focus on the present involvement of Naval Reservists in the acquisition process. Finally, it will examine the process used in obtaining and structuring the data to be presented.

Chapter III: PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED

This chapter will present a detailed description of the questionnaire responses. The responses will be categorized to facilitate the development of trends, patterns, and/or a consensus of opinion as appropriate. These categories will be analyzed and interpreted in Chapter IV. The skills profiles obtained from Part 3 of the questionnaire will be tabulated by rank to present a picture of the current qualification levels of these officers. Specific examples of reserve utilization will be included to more vividly illustrate the data collected.

Chapter IV: DATA ANALYSIS/INTERPRETATION

This chapter will look at the data and issues pertinent to the primary and subsidiary research questions. The questionnaire data, along with the results of the literature review and interviews, will be categorized, quantified,

compared, analyzed, and interpreted. This process will determine trends and commonalities that can be assessed for viability against existing and expected future policies.

Chapter V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter will draw the report together by combining the data and resulting analysis, leading to conclusions and recommendations for future policy and areas for possible further study.

II. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND METHODOLOGY

A. BACKGROUND

Reserve military forces in one form or another have been used to augment professional, standing armies since the early beginnings of organized warfare. America's basic concepts regarding the application of reserve forces evolved from England's traditional usage of locally raised militias, commanded by the resident nobility, to man its armies (Goldich, 1985). Colonists came to America with this concept entrenched, and it may have been the ready availability and effectiveness of their informal local militias that helped save the colonists during the various Indian wars and uprisings (Goldich, 1985). The militia concept proved itself during the colonial wars and onward through the end of the War of 1812. However, the pacification of the larger Indian tribes reduced the need for a rapidly mobilizable reserve force. This reality resulted in the general neglect of organized militias that lasted until the Civil War erupted. Until the early 1900's, reserve forces consisted of the various state militias. The Dick Act of 1903, the National Defense Act of 1916, and the National Defense Act of 1920 worked to establish federally controlled reserve forces,

primarily in support and technical specialties (Goldich, 1985).

U.S. Naval Reserve force history dates all the way back to the Revolutionary War. The citizen sailors of the state naval militias performed admirably, but the continued maintenance of their talent was not supported after the hostilities ended and they were eventually disbanded. Despite their untimely disestablishment, the concept of a naval militia did not entirely disappear. When the states failed to reinstitute their naval militias, President Jefferson proposed the establishment of a national naval militia, but Congress failed to appropriate the necessary funding (Kreh, 1969). This predicament continued until the beginning of the Civil War when Congress was left with no alternative but to authorize funding to hire ships and crews to augment the Regular Navy. "Abe Lincoln's Soapbox Navy" eventually comprised over 50% of the Union's fleet (Kreh, 1969). Once again, these battle hardened assets were disbanded at hostilities end.

In the late 1800's, efforts to establish a Federal Naval Reserve were not particularly successful, but the Navy Department did succeed somewhat in organizing the various state naval militias. These state naval militias were heavily used during the Spanish-American War, but were limited to service within the U.S. This issue was addressed by the states; however, when they permitted trained militiamen to take leaves of absences and volunteer for the Regular Navy.

This eventually resulted in the passing of legislation to create an Auxiliary Naval Force specifically recruited from the state naval militias. Repeating a now familiar pattern, the ships and crews of the Auxiliary Naval Force were released at war's end.

Although there was a general consensus concerning the rationale for an established national Naval Reserve unconnected with the various state naval militias, nothing significant happened until the passing of the Naval Militia Act of 1914. This Act consolidated the state naval militias under the Navy Department and gave the President authority to mobilize these assets in a national emergency. Subsequent legislation in 1915, urged by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels and Assistant Secretary Franklin Roosevelt, established the authority for a Federal Naval Reserve consisting of sailors honorably discharged from the Regular Navy (Kreh, 1969). Unfortunately, no provisions were made for paying or training these new reservists. The Naval Reserve Force Act of 1916 rectified this shortcoming. With World War I just around the corner, the formal organization of a Naval Reserve Force was a timely accomplishment. Naval Reservists' participation in the war was substantial, eventually comprising over 60% of the Navy's total personnel assets (Shriver, 1978). As had happened during previous periods of relative calm, reserve forces were allowed to atrophy and disintegrate after the war ended.

The United States found itself facing World War II with a desperate need to man its Navy, although the situation would have been much worse had lawmakers not taken steps in 1925 to reorganize the program.

> That there was a Naval Reserve to call upon was due only to the foresightedness of a few men who, between wars, remembered the lessons learned in 1917. Public apathy after the first war defeated the Navy's attempts to reorganize the released Reservists into drilling units with a definite program. Congress was cool to the idea of spending money for such things because, after all, we had just won the "war to end all wars." With poor facilities and less and less money, the Navy's attempt to keep a Naval Reserve faltered, and in 1921, it was forced to disenroll practically the entire Naval Reserve Force (Kreh, 1969).

The Naval Reserve went from being a force of 22,000 personnel in 1938 to one of over 3 million at the end of World War II, comprising over 80% of total Navy personnel strength in 1945 (Kreh, 1969). In a departure from the long established pattern of neglect during peacetime, reserve forces did not immediately fall into disrepair after the war. Various initiatives, including extensive recruiting, were taken to keep the reserve forces intact. President Truman sanctioned this effort by signing a bill in 1948 that provided retirement benefits for reservists. He went on to say:

> If the standing forces of the Regular establishments are to be kept small, as is the tradition of the United States, the civilian Reserve must always be ready as part of the trained nucleus around which a citizen Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Force can be built if need ever arises. The Reserve and Regular forces must therefore work together in effective teamwork, with the Regular Services providing the equipment, the training facilities, and the expert guidance needed by the Reserve forces, and the Reserve personnel devoting their best

efforts to keeping our national defense establishment in a constant state of readiness" (Kreh, 1969).

Korea saw the call-up of over 250,000 Naval Reservists, many with substantial World War II combat experience. The experiences of this recall led to the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as amended by the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. Despite this legislative boost, the reserves once again fell into disrepair. The personnel were there, but training programs and support were lacking. The Navy, recognizing the problem, initiated needed changes and established a nationwide command, the Naval Reserve Training Command, to administer the program. "This led to the Selected Reserve concept, which provides trained units and individuals for immediate active duty when needed" (Kreh, 1969).

Although manning levels, training support, funding, and hardware investment have all peaked and fallen several times in the years since the 1950's, the reserve forces have remained a fixture of our defense mechanism and have successfully mobilized as a command or augmented active forces in a variety of international and domestic contingencies. These include: The Berlin Airlift, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam Conflict, hundreds of civil disturbances, Operation Earnest Will, Operation Just Cause, and, most recently, Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Total Force Policy Report, 1990). Today, under the Total Force concept, active

and reserve forces are viewed as a single entity, with comparable equipment, training, and other resource support.

Under the hammer of an uncertain and rapidly shrinking defense budget, the fiscally and politically attractive reserve forces provide a potentially significant asset in maintaining America's defensive posture in the coming years. In fact, with the current constraints on the defense budget, the United States probably couldn't mount and sustain a significant military engagement without the involvement of reserve forces (Philbin and Gould, 1985). Although a general cost comparison would be misleading when comparing specific units, an aggregate cost savings of over 50% can be found when comparing active and reserve elements (Shriver, 1978). While primarily administrative-type units cost little more than the military pay of the reserve members, hardware intensive units represent the least in costs savings. For example, Naval Reserve forces ships are only 10% less expensive to operate than "fully-active, immediately deployable, fully-maintained front-line ships" (Report to the Congress, 1991).

Reserve elements have traditionally been thought of as "forces-in-reserve," a trained cadre of ready assets to augment active forces in times of hostility. Under the Total Force Policy, created by Secretary of Defense Laird, reserve forces are considered full partners with the active components (Moore, 1991). As Secretary Weinberger stated:

> We can no longer consider reserve forces as merely forces in reserve. Instead, they have to be an integral part of the total force, both within the U.S. and within NATO. They have to be, and in fact are, a blending of the professionalism of the full-time soldier with the professionalism of the citizen-soldier. Only in that way can we achieve the military strength that is necessary to defend our freedom (Philbin and Gould, 1985).

As "forces-in-being," reserves are not necessarily a mirror-image of their active counterparts, standing by to fill the additional manning allowances authorized to meet wartime requirements (Moore, 1991). Various units are now considered stand-alone commands as opposed to augmenting units, concentrating on mission capabilities that are not fully needed and/or economical to maintain in times of peace. Examples of these types of units include: cargo handling forces, fleet hospitals, coastal surveillance, fleet air logistics, and forward base component units (Moore, 1991).

The primary focus of various elements of the reserve forces is continuing to change as the overall military structure evolves. It is no longer simply a matter of a unit training for the possibility of recall or mobilization, but a question of what they can do now to support their active duty counterparts. This effort is referred to as contributory support, that is, contributing to the accomplishment of the gaining command's primary mission or by providing other essential support to the active forces in general.

Although literature makes little reference of Naval Reserve participation in the acquisition process, one can

logically assume that they have contributed in one way or another for as long as reserve forces have been in existence. Today, reservists are serving in a host of acquisition related billets at a variety of gaining commands such as: Naval Regional Contracting Centers, Naval Supply Centers, Systems Commands, and other staff augmenting units. The Supply Reserve Vision Study[2] sees the future of the Supply Reserve as supporting seven key functional "pillars." These are:

- Fleet Support
- Deployable Logistics Services
- Logistics Services
- Transportation
- Aviation Support
- Logistics Planning
- Information Systems Support

While acquisition is not considered a key functional pillar, it was specifically mentioned as being a critical component in four of these pillars.

The focus of this study is the Naval Reserve units directly affiliated with, and supporting the mission of, the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) and the Defense Contract Management District (DCMD) offices. These units are manned by approximately 125 reserve Navy Supply Corps officers

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[2]The Supply Reserve Vision Study was chartered to examine the present Supply Reserve and how it will support the active forces in the future. The Summary Report was release in November 1991.

ranging in rank from Lieutenant through Captain. They perform monthly drills and two weeks active duty for training per year, much the same as other reserve organizations. The primary difference between the DCMD units and most other reserve units is the fact that they generally perform their duties at the DCMD offices rather than a reserve center. The purpose is twofold: 1) hands-on training and, 2) contributory support.

Naval Reserve personnel involved in the acquisition process bring with them the full spectrum of education and experience. Some are GM-15 1102s (Contracting), fully qualified to assume whatever Acquisition Workforce duties may be assigned, while others have little or no practical experience or educational background in the field. Others have substantial civilian acquisition related experience that, while certainly an asset, may not be readily applicable to their duties at the DCMD units. Most have extensive civilian business experience that can be of value somewhere in the acquisition process. Regardless of their education or experience level coming into the billet, all officers must qualify by fulfilling the requirements of an Individual Training Plan (ITP)[3] tailored specifically to their mobilization billet. Completion of the ITP qualifies the individual to perform the duties required in their assigned

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[3]See Appendix B for representative examples of Individual Training Plans (ITP).

mobilization billet. One important aspect to note is that the reservist's contributory support functions may or may not be related to the duties and responsibilities the reservist would normally be expected to fulfill in his/her mobilization billet. Generally, the emphasis is on billet qualification until the officer becomes fully qualified, at which point he/she can then place greater focus on contributory support. Depending upon the experience and training the individual reservist brings into the unit, full qualification can take from one to two years.

Common DCMD reserve unit mobilization billet assignments include:

- Assistant Director
- Assistant Chief
- Production Officer
- Procurement Management Staff Officer
- Quality Assurance Officer
- Contract Administrator

The grades required to fill these billets are commensurate with those required to fill comparable active duty/civilian Acquisition Corps and Critical Acquisition Position jobs. With the passing of DAWIA, and its applicability to reservists undecided, some questions can be raised. If the active duty/civilian equivalent positions must be filled with personnel certified under DAWIA, can the reserve units continue to use their current billet structure and train to

standards they may never be able to satisfy? If the reserve units must change their billet structure to avoid this conflict, how will the new structure look? The intent of this thesis is to provide information that will help in answering these questions.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

There are vast amounts of literature available concerning reserve forces in general, and, in particular, their historical foundations and contributions to the defense of this nation. Most sources adequately describe the roles of the major combat arms elements, but provide little detail on the lesser known elements of the supporting arms. Therefore, there is little in print that covers the contributions of reserves involved in the acquisition process or the background and policies that guide their utilization. With that said, the following subsections will examine some of the literature available on related issues, policies, and background.

1. DAWIA

a. Legislative Background

The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) was included in the Defense Authorization Act of 1991, Public Law 101-510, as Title XII. The Act consists of two subchapters. The first addresses general responsibilities and calls for the Secretary of Defense to establish, and uniformly

implement, policies and procedures for the effective management of personnel serving in DoD acquisition positions.

> A primary emphasis in the DAWIA is on increased education, training, and qualification requirements. The Secretary of Defense is to establish education, training, and experience requirements based on the level of complexity of the duties carried out in the position. After October 1, 1993, there are positive requirements for contracting officers above the small purchase threshold (Edgar, 1991).

The education, training, and experience requirements vary depending upon the level and particular acquisition career field. The requirements are cumulative and generally must be fulfilled in each level before progressing to the next higher level. There are three levels in which acquisition personnel can qualify (DODM 5000.52M, 1991):

- Basic Level (Level I) - Basic level training standards, designed to establish fundamental qualifications in the individual's career field and prepare personnel for positions of increasing responsibility. Full qualification must be attained within 18 months of assignment. Generally applicable to GS-05 through 08, and officer ranks of O-1 through O-3.

- Intermediate Level (Level II) - Development progresses, specialization is emphasized, but general expertise in the career field is important. Individuals should meet Level II qualification standards prior to assignment. If not, they must be completed within 18 months. Generally applicable to GS-09 through 12, and officer ranks of O-3/O-4.

- Senior Level (Level III) - All requirements for Levels I and II should be completed. The individual should have significant knowledge and experience in his/her career field and a general understanding of the entire acquisition process. Individuals should meet Level III qualification requirements prior to assignment. If not, they must be completed within 18 months. Generally applicable to GS/GM-13 and above, and officer ranks O-4 and above.

Detailed training, education, and experience requirements for each level can be found in Appendix A.

The second subchapter concerns acquisition positions. It calls for the Secretary of Defense to designate, by regulation, defense acquisition positions to "include all acquisition-related positions in 11 different categories, including contracting ..." (Edgar, 1991). The Secretary is also required to establish specific career paths in each field, and must limit the reservation of assignments for military officers to those positions where it is essential for the performance of duties, required by law, or otherwise justified (Edgar, 1991).

The forces that led to the passing of DAWIA evolved over a number of years. Early attempts by Congress and the Department of Defense to address perceived and real problems in the acquisition process were aimed more at the process itself. The publishing of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and a stream of agency and component directives and instructions were the result. The newsmaking problems encountered in the 1980's shifted attention to the management structure and personnel employed in the acquisition system. The Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985, reports from the Packard Commission, Military Service and academic studies, and the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act of 1986 addressed the issues of education, training, career path, opportunities,

and experience. DAWIA essentially grew out of these efforts and is intended to "create a body of well-educated, trained, and dedicated acquisition professionals" (SECNAVINST 5300.34, 1991).

b. Applicability to Reservists

The applicability of DAWIA to the reserves has been, and is currently being, examined and debated. The original draft version of DAWIA specifically addressed reserves; however, this coverage was later dropped.[4] The exact intent of Congress is not known, but the implication is that they did not intend for it to apply to reservists. Nothing could be found in writing that supports or contradicts this implication. Additionally, DoD and Navy guidance implementing DAWIA does not specifically address the reserve applicability of DAWIA. Therefore, it is left up to DLA and the individual Services to decide for themselves how DAWIA will be applied, if at all, to their reserve personnel and billets.

Many individuals queried felt that it would be impractical to apply DAWIA to the reserves. Based on their limited active duty experience and training, and the difficulty of completing the necessary training requirements in the capacity of a drilling reservist, very few officers would be able to attain

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[4]Several unrelated and anonymous sources provided this information.

the level of training and experience necessary to qualify for Acquisition Corps billets commensurate with their grade.

> The consensus of everyone that I talked with on this subject was that it is impractical to apply DAWIA to the reserves, and if it were applied, few, if any, reserves would ever be able to meet the training and experience requirements to be certified for Acquisition Corps billets. In the past, any requirements applicable to active duty billets were also applied to comparable reserve billets at DLA .... While this precedent suggests DAWIA should be applied to the reserves, DoD has many rules and regulations that are waived during mobilization, and it is logical that Acquisition Corps certifications required by DAWIA would be waived in wartime (Atchley, 1992).

There is a fear that "opponents of the Reserve community would seize upon a double standard of qualification for Reserves to reduce program funding and manpower" (Morgan, 1992). However, adequately addressing the question of effective utilization of reserve assets should be sufficient in countering any opposition. Regardless of specific utilization conclusions, the training requirements of DAWIA will logically be the guiding force in determining the mobilization billet training standards for DLA acquisition reservists, whether or not DAWIA is found applicable. At the present time, DAWIA is the standard. Some proponents recommend that a preference be shown for officers at, or close to, certification at a certain level when making billet assignments. One Service has determined that, because of the demands of Level III certification, their benchmark for all ranks would be qualification at Level II. In reality, these requirements are

not markedly different than pre-DAWIA requirements for most reserve procurement billets.

2. DLA, DCMC, and Contributory Support

The Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS), DCMC's predecessor, was born in January 1966 as a branch of the Defense Supply Agency (now DLA). The concept for administering all Defense contracts under a single command evolved during the McNamara years. Overlapping coverage, duplication of effort, differing systems and approaches, and a general lack of coordination among various agencies and departments were prevalent in an era where all Military Services and agencies administered their own contracts. Project 60 was chartered in 1962 to look at the contract administration function and to:

> Prepare a plan for establishing uniform field contract management covering all the contract management functions and further provide alternate plans for establishing this uniform structure outside of the perimeters of the Military Departments (Mastin, 1973).

Based on the results of the Project 60 study, McNamara established a project of limited scope to test the concept of consolidated contract administration services (Mastin, 1973). Following successful completion of the limited and follow-on national tests, DCAS was formally established. Its strength then, as it remains now, is the "single face to industry," a viable means of eliminating confusion while achieving economies of scale and efficiencies.

Project 60 was not to be the end of investigations into, and audits of, the contract administration function. In 1975, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) chartered a comprehensive review known as "Forward Look" (Forward Look, 1976). This study generated many policy and manpower actions, particularly in the engineering area, in its effort to prepare the contract administration function for the future.

One of the key objectives for the future of DLA reserve participation concerns value-adding contributory support (RFAC Minutes, 1993). Reserve units must still plan and train for possible mobilization, but in doing so they must also be a cost effective asset. As MGEN Aler, USAFR, stated, "...we serve as an insurance policy in case of war and we must insure the premium cost is paid during peacetime as value added..." (RFAC Minutes, 1993). The Reserve Mission Statement for DLA affiliated units sums this up (RFAC Minutes, 1993):

> The DLA Reserve Mission is to provide the right people, trained, ready and available with a unique blend of military and civilian talent and experience to meet contingency requirements and provide support to DLA day to day operations.

DLA is currently examining many areas in an effort to solve problems and/or prepare for the future. Two areas mentioned specifically address Naval Reserve participation. The first, Business Development, hopes to use a "...DLA/Naval Reserve team to accumulate and analyze market information for a Business Development Plan" (RFAC Minutes, 1993). The second

area, Special Remedies, involves contract fraud investigations by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Naval Reservists have in the past provided specialized business and contractual expertise to augment DOJ's scarce manpower resources and speed indictment/conviction efforts (RFAC Minutes, 1993). Although on the surface this may seem like a peacetime activity, the "risk of contractor error/fraud can be expected to be higher in the increased level of activity that accompanies wartime tempo" (Supply Reserve Vision Study, 1991). These distinct initiatives clearly indicate that there is a place for Naval Reservists in the acquisition process and are consistent with observed historical benefits of reserve force involvement. Specifically, reserves can provide an important channel for networking and serving as translators and constructive brokers between civilian and military institutions (Zuricher, 1986). Active duty and civilian Government employees involved in the acquisition process frequently lack industrial experience. They may be fluent in military jargon and bureaucratese, but lack savvy in, and a deep understanding of, the corporate world. The reservist is often fluent in not only the language of the military and bureaucrat, but intimately knows the language of the business community (Morgan interview, 1993). It makes sense to use the reservist as an interface, a translator, or even a troubleshooter. In a loosely related development, there has been some involvement of reservists in a consulting group capacity (Morgan interview, 1993). This

concept appears to remove some of the emphasis on qualifying for a mobilization billet, and concentrates more on utilizing the skills the reservist has already developed through years of active duty, reserve, and civilian involvement.

There is precedence for emphasizing greater use of a reservist's civilian expertise. The Air Force Reserve Associate Program provides one such example (Philbin and Gould, 1985). As Philbin and Gould further elaborate:

> In the total-force environment, and at a time when the DoD is placing more stress on cost-savings, it may be preferable to organize qualified Reservists, for whom staff or unit billets are not readily available, into specialized task forces that work on priority projects requiring their unique expertise (Philbin and Gould, 1985).

Failing to acknowledge and use the vast amounts of business expertise offered by reservists, gained free of charge through civilian endeavors, constitutes a lost opportunity at achieving greater economies and efficiencies. This fact was not lost on the participants of the Supply Reserve Vision Study. Sitting atop the "seven pillars" are six strategies for the future, including:

- Maximize Contributory Support
- Leverage Civilian Skills

By leveraging civilian skills, the Navy can increase its return on investment, just as a successful business enterprise increases return through effective use of financial leverage.

C. METHODOLOGY

The methodology for conducting this study relied on questionnaires (Appendix A) completed by Naval Reserve Supply Corps officers actively working in DCMC affiliated units. The questionnaires were designed in three parts to solicit hard information along with the experiences and opinions of the respondents. Part 1 asks the respondents to list their current civilian occupation, reserve billet, and years of service. The purpose of this part is to categorize the respondent by billet, occupation, and length of service. Part 2 is the core of the questionnaire. It asks for a comprehensive list of military and civilian acquisition-related positions held including duties and responsibilities, earned Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) codes, opinions on duties performed, and opinions on duties the respondent would like, and feels qualified, to perform. The purpose of this part is to categorize the respondent by experience, duties performed, and opinions concerning utilization potential. Part 3 is a skills profile based on the requirements listed in DAWIA. The respondent is asked to check-off attainment of the specific training, education, and experience requirements for Levels I through III. The purpose of this part is to ascertain where reserve officers stand in meeting the requirements for certification under DAWIA.

The data generated through this questionnaire will be categorized and consolidated to determine commonalities,

differences, and patterns pointing to a general consensus of opinion and conclusions on the most effective utilization of reservists. This consensus will then be compared to the literature review information previously presented to determine the practicality of the respondents utilization concepts. Literature and interviews used in conducting this study are listed in the bibliography.

III. PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED

The raw data for this thesis were generated through the use of two questionnaires. The first questionnaire (Appendix A) was forwarded to the approximately 125 reserve officers currently serving in DCMD affiliated billets. Each officer was provided with a companion questionnaire (Appendix B) to forward to the active duty or civilian DCMD employee with whom he/she interacts the most. Appendices A and B are alike in design for the purpose of collecting similar data from the two distinct groups. Of 250 questionnaires mailed, 61 were returned completed: 47 from SELRES officers and 14 from DCMD employees, for a response rate of 37.6 percent and 11.2 percent, respectively. The remainder of this chapter will present the data generated by the questionnaires. The data will be presented in the same format as the surveys were constructed; that is, each question and its responses will be addressed individually in order. Responses will be presented as a percentage of total responses received. In employing open-ended questions, such as the ones used in this survey, it is entirely possible to obtain as many different answers as there are respondents. This undisciplined element was intentional to allow respondents to answer freely, without the encumbrance of trying to fit responses into arbitrary

categories established by the researcher. However, to simplify presentation and analysis, responses will be categorized and grouped according to similarities that became evident during the collation effort. To ensure that the value of significant individual responses is not lost, specific comments will be presented to clarify or support a particular point or as otherwise deemed appropriate.

Before presenting the data generated by the questionnaires, a brief overview of the units involved in this research is appropriate. Currently, there are 122 Navy Supply Corps officer billets aligned with the DCMD units. This represents about 12 percent of all officers in Supply Corps Reserve programs. Many of the units carry additional officers above their authorized billet allowance. These may be transients awaiting a permanent reserve billet, officers technically attached to another unit but drilling with the DCMD unit, or junior officers enrolled in the Basic Qualification Course at the Naval Supply Corps School. Officers from the latter category are generally assigned to units such as the DCMD affiliates because of the significant Supply Corps experience embodied in the unit structure. The units themselves are geographically spread throughout the United States and are organizationally aligned with the DCMC Headquarters and the five district DCMD offices. Table 3-1 presents the units, their locations, and authorized billets.

TABLE 3-1: RESERVE DCMD UNITS

UNITS	LOCATION	BILLETS
NR DCMD BOSTON A 101	QUINCY, MA	11
NR DCMD BOSTON B 202	BRONX, NY	10
NR DCMD PHILADELPHIA A 304	PHILADELPHIA, PA	10
NR DCMD PHILADELPHIA B 405	CLEVELAND, OH	13
NR DCMC WASHINGTON 106	WASHINGTON, DC	16
NR DCMD ATLANTA A 708	ATLANTA, GA	11
NR DCMD ATLANTA B 811	DALLAS, TX	10
NR DCMD CHICAGO A 513	FOREST PARK, IL	15
NR DCMD CHICAGO B 618	ST. LOUIS, MO	8
NR DCMD LOS ANGELES, A 919	LOS ANGELES, CA	11
NR DCMD LOS ANGELES B 1020	SAN BRUNO, CA	7

Source: Supply Corps Reserve Program Directory, 1993

A. SELRES QUESTIONNAIRES

Part 1 of the questionnaire written for SELRES officers asked for general information such as: Reserve Unit, Mobilization Billet, Time in Unit, and Current Civilian Occupation. The specific reserve unit and mobilization billet were solicited from each respondent to facilitate any subsequent determination of trends or patterns in responses, and will be used during analysis of generated data in Chapter IV. Table 3-2 provides a summary of the respondents' time in unit, years of active duty, and years of drilling reserve participation.

The figures generated for "Time in Unit" are consistent with the Naval Reserve's policy of regularly rotating SELRES officers among different and varied pay billets. Respondents indicated that the norm for the Air Force and Army IMAs they work with tends to be five to six years of association with any one particular command. The mean and median for length

TABLE 3-2: TIME IN SERVICE

	O-4/BELOW MEAN	MEDIAN	RANGE	O-5/O-6 MEAN	MEDIAN	RANGE
TIME IN UNIT (YRS)	1.2	1.0	.5 - 3.0	1.8	1.3	.5 - 4.5
ACTIVE DUTY (YRS)	5.1	5.5	0 - 11.5	5.7	5.0	2.5 - 11.0
RESERVE DUTY (YRS)	5.9	7.0	.5 - 22.0	14.5	14.5	6.0 - 21.0

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 1

of active duty in both categories of officers results from a predominant cluster of service lengths around the five year point. This length of active duty is consistent with an initial sea tour and a follow-on shore tour prior to release from active duty. Very few officers continued on to further active duty assignments.

Another significant area surveyed in Part 1 of the questionnaire concerned the reserve officer's current civilian occupation. While no two respondents were identically employed, their occupations could be generally categorized into five areas: Acquisition, Management, Banking/Finance, Planning/Analysis, and Other Occupations. These categories were selected by the researcher based on the predominant responsibility the respondents cited in his/her job description, if offered, or those that could be inferred from the occupational title itself. The following list provides a brief explanation of the various occupation categories:

- Acquisition - Public and private sector occupations involved directly in the procurement of systems or material, or those strongly related to, supporting, or managing the procurement of systems or material.

- Management - Public or private sector occupations primarily involved in managing, and having personal responsibility for, personnel and/or material assets.

- Banking/Finance - Private sector occupations involved in banking, financial markets, or the management of monetary assets.

- Planning/Analysis - Public and private sector occupations primarily involved in planning/analytical endeavors without the encumbrance of management responsibilities.

- Other Occupations - All occupations that don't fit one of the above categories. Consists mainly of officers who are self-employed.

Table 3-3 outlines these categories, the percentage of respondents in each, and some of the specific jobs highlighting each category.

A more detailed classification of occupations can be made if consideration is given to the environment in which the respondents are employed. For example, almost half of the SELRES officers grouped under the Acquisition category are Government employees. Others are employed in project management or contracting departments of defense contractors; therefore, they are very well versed in the intricacies of Government acquisition. The rest occupy positions that lend themselves to gaining familiarity with a variety of business enterprises and systems.

Some members (approximately 30%) of the Management category listed purchasing, contracting, or acquisition as one of their more important duties, although not a primary one. Those that didn't cite acquisition as part of their duties

TABLE 3-3: CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONS

CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE EMPLOYED	REPRESENTATIVE POSITIONS
ACQUISITION	21%	PROC. ANALYST (GS-1102) AUDITOR (DCAA) CONTRACT ADMINISTRATORS CONTRACTS MANAGERS PROJECT MANAGERS MATERIAL MANAGERS
MANAGEMENT	30%	BUSINESS MANAGERS MATERIAL CONTROL SALES MANAGERS SYSTEMS MANAGERS WAREHOUSE OPERATIONS SENIOR EXECUTIVES
BANKING/FINANCE	23%	SECURITIES ANALYSTS BANK OFFICERS AUDITORS FINANCIAL MANAGERS
PLANNING/ANALYSIS	13%	PRODUCTION PLANNING BUSINESS PLANNING OPERATIONS ANALYSTS SYSTEMS ANALYSTS LOGISTICS PLANNING
OTHER OCCUPATIONS	13%	ACCOUNTANTS (CPA) ATTORNEYS AT LAW EDUCATORS ENTREPRENEURS

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 1

nonetheless claimed that their business experience is applicable to some of the duties and responsibilities they're assigned at the reserve unit. Similarly, members involved in Banking/Finance and Planning/Analysis offered their experiences with a variety of businesses, accounting systems, processes, and ADP as applicable to some role in the Government acquisition process. Lastly, 50 percent of the attorneys listed contract law/litigation as one of their areas of expertise and employment.

Part 2 of the questionnaire solicited responses concerning the SELRES officer's duties, qualifications, likes, dislikes, and other thoughts he/she may have concerning future

utilization. As with the responses in Part 1, the data will be categorized as appropriate for each question. The survey questions will be addressed individually.

Question 1. Please list all contracting related positions you have held in your capacity as a civilian, active duty officer, and reserve officer; and summarize your duties, responsibilities, and length of time you held each position. Please list any professional affiliations and certifications that apply, i.e. NCMA/CPCM.

The purpose of this question was to develop an experience profile consisting of all practical acquisition experience the reservists may have had throughout their military and civilian careers. Almost all respondents (87 percent) claimed small purchasing experience gained during their initial sea tours. Approximately one third had active duty acquisition experience over and above small purchase. About one half (17 percent of total respondents) of these received their experience at elements of the Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS). Another third claimed prior reserve experience in an acquisition billet at a DCAS affiliated unit, a Naval Regional Contracting Center (NRCC) unit, or at a shipyard/staff unit requiring acquisition training and Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) codes. Lastly, almost half claimed some form of acquisition experience in their civilian employment history. Table 3-4 outlines the questionnaire responses by category (active, reserve, and civilian), lists the percentage of positive responses, and cites representative positions. The reader is referred back to Table 3-3 for representative

TABLE 3-4: PRIOR ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE

EXPERIENCE CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE RESPONDING	REPRESENTATIVE POSITIONS
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY	32%	ASSISTANT CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER BUYER CONTRACTING OFFICER'S TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE PROCURING CONTRACTING OFFICER PURCHASING AGENT
		PROCUREMENT STAFF TERMINATIONS SPECIALIST
RESERVE MILITARY	38%	AUDIT OFFICER ASSISTANT PROCUREMENT OFFICER VARIOUS PAY BILLETS AT DCMD (FORMERLY DCAS UNITS), NRCC, AND SHIPYARD UNITS
CIVILIAN	41%	REFER TO TABLE 3-3

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 2, Question 1

positions under the Civilian experience category. Table 3-3 lists only 21 percent in the Acquisition category, while Table 3-4 lists 41 percent with civilian acquisition experience. The difference is due to the classification of the Civilian Occupations. The Acquisition category in Table 3-3 lists only those respondents who cited primarily acquisition related positions as their current profession. Table 3-4 includes attorneys and other individuals who cited acquisition functions as part of their employment even though it may not be their primary responsibility, and includes individuals who had previously worked in acquisition related areas.

Question 1 also queried respondents for years of experience in each category. Table 3-5 summarizes this information. The longevity cited for active duty acquisition experience (2.8 years) corresponds to approximately one tour

of duty and includes only those respondents who replied positively. The longevity cited for reserve experience

TABLE 3-5: YEARS OF ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE

CATEGORY	MEAN	RANGE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY	2.8	2.0 - 5.0
RESERVE MILITARY	4.6	1.0 - 12.0
CIVILIAN	8.5	1.0 - 16.0

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 2, Question 1

corresponds to approximately one and one half reserve tours at a DCMD, NRCC, or other applicable unit.

Questions 2 and 3 are interrelated and will be addressed together. Prior to addressing these questions, it is appropriate to briefly describe what a NOBC code is and what the codes addressed in this study represent. NOBCs are used to identify skills required for a particular position, and conversely, also identify an individual reservist's qualifications achieved through experience (military and civilian), education, or both. A match between a required NOBC and an earned NOBC indicates that the individual is qualified for that position. Although DCMD billets may require a variety of NOBCs depending upon the focus of the particular position, this study is concentrating on the three listed below as they are applicable to other contracting/acquisition type billets that could be filled by anyone interested in pursuing a formal acquisition career

path. A brief definition of these codes is presented below (Ross, 1993):

- 1476-Procurement Management Officer - Manages procurement functions, establishes policies and procedures governing procurement and production of materials, products, and services. Determines procurement objectives, monitors contract administration, quality assurance, and production surveillance. Evaluates contractor performance, contractor business/financial operations, practices, and decisions. Directs all phases of the contracting process.

- 1480-Procurement Contracting Officer - Contracts for systems, equipment, supplies, and services. Reviews requests, solicits bids/proposals, evaluates sources, negotiates, and awards contracts.

- 1485-Administrative Contracting Officer - Administers all types of contracts. Approves wage schedules, progress payments, and accounting, estimating, and purchasing systems. Determines allowability and allocability of costs, manages inspection programs, monitors delivery, and analyzes claims. Negotiates and executes contract modifications, negotiates overhead rates, supervises property administration and security requirements.

Question 2. Have you earned one of the following Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) codes?

NOBC	Yes	No
1476 - Procurement Management Officer	___	___
1480 - Procurement Contracting Officer	___	___
1485 - Administrative Contracting Officer	___	___

Question 3. If you answered yes to any of the NOBCs listed above, please describe the basis upon which it was granted.

These NOBCs are the primary ones required of SELRES officers in most acquisition billets. The successful attainment of one or more of these is necessary before the reservist can be considered mobilization billet qualified. To qualify for a particular NOBC, the reservist must complete a

specific list of course work and/or meet certain experience milestones depending upon whether the NOBC was earned on active or reserve duty. Table 3-6 summarizes the "yes" responses to Question 2, and the basis for obtainment responses to Question 3.

TABLE 3-6: NAVY OFFICER BILLET CLASSIFICATION (NOBC) CODES

CATEGORY	1476	1480	1485	HOW OBTAINED
O-4 AND BELOW	0%	10%	25%	INTERNSHIP PROGRAM CORRESPONDENCE COURSE ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING (AT) ACTIVE DUTY EXPERIENCE
O-5/O-6	7%	22%	59%	CORRESPONDENCE COURSES ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING ACTIVE DUTY EXPERIENCE AND SCHOOLING

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 2, Questions 2 and 3

Due to the nature of the mission of the DCMD units, NOBC 1485 is by far the most frequently earned code among these three. Information regarding the other two codes is pertinent when determining the reservist's qualifications for follow-on acquisition billets with other commands as part of a formal acquisition career path.

While virtually all of the senior officers possessed the requisite NOBC for their particular billet, most would find themselves requiring a year or more to earn one of the other NOBCs in qualifying for other acquisition related billets/units. The majority of the junior officers surveyed were in the process of earning their required NOBC; however,

they would be in the same situation were they to move to another unit or functional billet.

Question 4. Please list the tasks and duties you are currently performing during your IDT/IDTT/AT that you feel contribute most to the mission of the DCMD.

This question was intended to be an open-ended query to determine what the individual respondents felt were their strongest contributions to the mission effectiveness of their gaining commands. The responses were broken into five categories based on the general nature of the tasks assigned. Over one fourth of the respondents listed some form of audit or review as a task they viewed as contributing to the mission of their gaining command. Taskings that fell into this category included anything that required the reservist to review a system or process for compliance, accuracy, or effectiveness. Over one third of the respondents cited Analysis/Research/Planning as providing a significant contribution. Taskings that fell into this category included those which required the reservist to generate information and make a decision or recommendation based on that data.

Surprisingly, only about one fifth of the respondents listed contract administration functions as a significant contributor to mission effectiveness. Most indicated that they would like to do more in this area, but time and accessibility to personnel and files prevented more involvement. Almost one fourth of the respondents listed the provision of training to contractors as a major contribution.

Finally, several respondents mentioned the concept of providing consulting services as an area they felt provided a significant contribution. Table 3-7 summarizes the general tasks or duties that respondents felt contributed positively, the percentage of respondents participating, and representative taskings within these general areas.

TABLE 3-7: MISSION CONTRIBUTIONS

GENERAL CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE RESPONDING	REPRESENTATIVE TASKINGS
AUDITING/REVIEW	23%	PROGRESS PAYMENT AUDITS INTERNAL PROCESS REVIEWS CONTRACT COMPLIANCE DATABASE VALIDATION INTERNAL CONTROLS AUDIT OVERAGE CONTRACTS
ANALYSIS/RESEARCH PROJECTS/ STRATEGIC PLANNING	32%	BUY VS. LEASE ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS RISK ASSESSMENTS ACCOUNTING SYSTEM PROBLEMS PENSION PLAN ASSESSMENTS RECONCILIATIONS MANPOWER UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT ACTION TEAMS CLAIMS INVESTIGATIONS
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION	17%	CONTRACT CLOSEOUT PRICE/COST ANALYSIS MONITOR WAIVERS, DEVIATIONS, ECPS SMALL BUSINESS UTILIZATION PRE/POST-AWARD SURVEYS QUALITY ASSURANCE
TRAINING	21%	CONTRACTOR TRAINING AND ORIENTATION SMALL BUSINESS PRESENTATIONS
CONSULTING SERVICES	7%	MANAGEMENT CONSULTING LEGAL COUNSEL ADP/SOFTWARE USAGE AND DEVELOPMENT

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 2, Question 4

Question 5. Please list any tasks and duties you are currently performing during your IDT/IDTT/AT that you feel do not contribute to the overall mission effectiveness of the DCMD (i.e. any make-work assignments?).

Respondents were more adamant concerning their responses to Question 5 than they were to Question 4. There was general agreement (62 percent) that administrative requirements (Naval Reserve administrative matters vice DLA/DCMC administrative matters) consumed a significant amount of time. These requirements included General Military Training, parent reserve center taskings, and a wide assortment of Navy reports, papers, records, and forms. A significant portion of most drill weekends are spent on these matters, effectively reducing the amount of time available to other matters such as training and contributory support. Other respondents indicated that isolated, unrelated, and trivial projects, such as routine clerical work, were time wasters when compared to comprehensive unit projects of obvious importance to the gaining command. The respondents felt that these projects tended to be make-work assignments, contributing little to the mission accomplishment of the office. Conversely, comprehensive unit projects tended to lead to larger, more complex assignments that were more easily viewed as contributing significantly to the DCMD office. Table 3-8 summarizes these results.

Question 6. Please list any tasks and duties you are not currently asked to perform that you feel you have the requisite experience and skills to perform, and that would enhance your contribution to the mission of the unit.

The respondents were previously asked what they do that they feel contributes and what they do that they feel doesn't

TABLE 3-8: NON-PRODUCTIVE DUTIES

GENERAL CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE RESPONDING	REPRESENTATIVE TASKS/DUTIES
NAVAL RESERVE ADMINISTRATION	62%	GENERAL MILITARY TRAINING DC/3-M TRAINING NAVAL RESERVE MANDATED REPORTS NON-DLA ADMINISTRATIVE PAPERWORK TRIPS TO THE RESERVE CENTER
UNDER-UTILIZATION	24%	MAKE-WORK ASSIGNMENTS TRIVIAL PROJECTS
ALL ASSIGNMENTS CONTRIBUTE TO THE MISSION OF DCMD	5%	
NO RESPONSE	19%	

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 2, Question 5

Note: Responses total to greater than 100 percent due to the acceptance of multiple responses from any one respondent.

contribute to the mission of their gaining command. This question is really the core of the thesis as it solicits the ideas of the reservists concerning the possibilities for their future utilization. Since each reservist is speaking from a unique prior experience background and viewpoint, as modified by current insight, this researcher expected, and received, a wide range of responses to the question. A wide variety of functional areas were mentioned, with no single area receiving more than 10 percent of the responses. Interestingly, each respondent cited only one area, and the task mentioned tended to be something already being accomplished, not a new tasking. As such, the responses were very similar to those items listed as current contributions to the mission of the gaining commands. Respondents and gaining commands reporting sound working relationships tended to agree not only on current utilization, but future utilization as well. This "agreement"

was the only pattern evident from the responses. The variety and nature of the responses defies establishing a clear trend as to the path these units should follow toward achieving their most effective employment other than to continue what they are doing at present. Table 3-9 summaries the results of this question.

TABLE 3-9: FUTURE UTILIZATION

GENERAL CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE RESPONDING	REPRESENTATIVE TASKS/DUTIES
AUDITING/REVIEWS	30%	PRE/POST-NEGOTIATION REVIEWS PROCESS REVIEWS AUDITING COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM EVALUATION DATA GATHERING EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT
ANALYSIS/RESEARCH/ PLANNING	35%	FINANCIAL ANALYSIS SYSTEMS ANALYSIS RISK ASSESSMENTS SPECIAL PROJECTS NEGOTIATION PLANNING
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION	18%	DEPLOYABLE CONTRACTUAL SUPPORT COST/PRICE ANALYSIS QUALITY ASSURANCE CONTRACT CLOSEOUT CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS CONTRACT LITIGATION PRE-AWARD SURVEY
NO RESPONSE	17%	

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 2, Question 6

Question 7. Do you feel there are adequate controls in place to prevent conflicts of interest between your civilian employment and your duties at DCMD? If inadequate, please indicate suggested controls for future implementation.

The purpose of this question was to assess the perceived exposure to a conflict of interest considering the tasks assigned the reservists. Since their duties generally require little interaction with contractors or access to material or

information that could lead to a conflict of interest, most reserve officers are not exposed to this risk. However, for the DCMC reservist this may be a relevant issue, especially when the member is employed by a defense contractor. Most respondents (92 percent) indicated that there are adequate controls in place to prevent conflicts of interest. Controls mentioned consisted of the completion of a Confidential Statement of Affiliations and Financial Interests (DD Form 1555), the standard conflict of interests statement executed upon commencement of Active Duty for Training, and awareness training as part of GMT or another forum. Eight percent indicated that adequate controls were not in place, but declined to specify why they felt this way or suggest further controls to improve adequacy. One respondent hinted that he/she had observed a conflict of interest situation, but declined to elaborate as to action planned or taken in the matter.

Question 8. If a structured acquisition career path were available, would you choose to continue to pursue billets in the field? Why or why not?

The respondents were in general agreement (76 percent) that they would pursue acquisition billets if there were a structured career path. Ten percent indicated that they thought a structured career path was a sound idea, but that they were not interested in participating. The remainder were not interested and didn't feel that a structured path was a viable idea.

Reasons for desiring a structured path differed between respondents. Some indicated that they simply enjoyed the business-like environment and challenges of the acquisition field and would be content to pursue a career path exclusively in acquisition. Other respondents indicated that they would like to stay in acquisition exclusively because it parallels their civilian careers, allowing them to make maximum use of all experiences gained. Most were concerned that while a structured path would be desirable, the Naval Reserve has traditionally emphasized regular rotation among the various billets available, and that obtaining a wide breadth of experience is essential for promotion. Aside from the promotion issue, respondents conceded that there are certainly benefits to becoming a generalist, but maintained that becoming an expert in the acquisition business is difficult to do in a few short years. Respondents indicated that any move to structure an acquisition career path would require some assurance that promotion opportunities would be equivalent to those for the generalists.

Respondents were also concerned that a shorter tenure in DCMD billets placed them at a disadvantage professionally when compared to other Services. The Naval Reserve keeps personnel in DCMD billets for about three years, taking at least one to two years to meet the mobilization billet requirements unless the individual has significant prior experience and qualifications. The other Services, placing IMAs at the

DCMDs, generally keep their personnel in a stable billet for five or more years. Many respondents indicated that this length of tenure seemed to be more agreeable to their gaining commands. Table 3-10 summarizes the results of Question 8.

TABLE 3-10: STRUCTURED CAREER PATH

STRUCTURED CAREER PATH?	PERCENTAGE RESPONDING	WHY?
YES	77%	INTEREST IN FIELD PARALLEL CIVILIAN CAREER MORE EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION MATCH OTHER SERVICES TENURE BETTER CONTRIBUTORY SUPPORT MUST BE CREDIBLE PROGRAM
NO	23%	NOT INTERESTED IN FIELD DECREASED PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES UNDER CURRENT SYSTEM RESERVES DON'T BELONG IN ACQUISITION

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 2, Question 8

Question 9. Any other issues (positive or negative) concerning Naval Reserve participation in Defense Contract Management?

This question was designed as a catch-all to give the respondents an opportunity to express whatever thoughts they may have had that didn't quite fit into one of the previous questions. Only 24 percent of the respondents took this opportunity to add to their questionnaires. Some of these comments were not particularly positive, but are included for information and to keep other findings in perspective. The following list includes some of these thoughts/suggestions:

- Contract closeout can't be performed on weekends. Many of the principals involved (Administrative Contracting Officer [ACO], contractor, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, etc) don't work weekends.

- Mechanics of contract administration can be taught, but contractor knowledge and trust of ACO can't -- it's difficult to become viable member of the DCMD with so little time and interaction.

- Trying to get qualifications noticed and used is difficult; no consistent method is available. Need clearer training plan for junior officers and more reasonable approach to becoming qualified; that is, relate the training to the actual job being performed.

- Great upper management support, but little opportunity to interact with workers.

- Navy must get serious about providing resources and lengthening assignment duration. Rotation is bad, frequent turnover is disruptive. Rotation policy and DAWIA are incompatible.

- Navy unit concept is viable, good for coordination, can include other Services.

- Mobilization billet qualification is not that important, should recall become a reality, we could get "up to speed" fairly quickly in any area the gaining command needed us.

- Need line officers because of expanded role of Program and Technical Support function. There is also a need for Judge Advocate General Corps officers.

Part 3 of the questionnaire concentrated on the skills profiles of the reservists in relation to the certification requirements of DAWIA. As previously stated in this study, the applicability of DAWIA to the reservists and their billet structure is currently undecided. The prevailing opinion is that it most likely won't be applicable to reservists, now or in the future. However, inventorying skills with respect to the certification requirements of DAWIA was considered by this researcher to be appropriate as it presents an easily identifiable standard by which personnel qualification comparisons can be made. A secondary reason for collecting

these data is that while at least one other Service has cataloged reserve members skills, the Naval Reserve has yet to formally profile its members with respect to DAWIA.

Less than half of the reservists (41 percent) qualified to Level I. The baccalaureate requirements for commission and the primary training courses required for all DCMD and other contracting related billets support this standard. Many reservists were pursuing Level II qualifications, but only a few (less than 10 percent) had completed the requirements. These tended to be the individuals who were involved in Government contracting in their civilian occupations. There were no respondents who had completed all of the requirements for Level III. Table 3-11 summarizes the results of the skills profiles.

B. GAINING COMMAND QUESTIONNAIRES

The gaining command questionnaires (Appendix B) are very similar in content to the SELRES questionnaires (Appendix A), with the exception of Part 3. The skill profiles of the gaining command personnel with whom the reservists interact were not considered important to this study. Part 1 solicited general information such as the respondent's command, the sponsored reserve unit, time at command, time working with reserves, and current position. The specific command and sponsored reserve unit were solicited to facilitate a determination of trends or patterns in responses, and will be

TABLE 3-11: DAWIA SKILLS PROFILE

DAWIA REQUIREMENTS	QUALIFIED
LEVEL I	
EXPERIENCE: ONE YEAR OF ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE	73%
EDUCATION: BACCALAUREATE DEGREE (OR 24 HRS OF BUSINESS COURSES)	68%
TRAINING: MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS	68%
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT PRICING	41%
LEVEL II	
EXPERIENCE: TWO YEARS OF ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE	46%
EDUCATION: SAME AS LEVEL I	98%
TRAINING: GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW	68%
MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS (ADVANCED)	46%
ADVANCED CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION	16%
QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR COST/PRICE ANALYSIS	8%
LEVEL III	
EXPERIENCE: MINIMUM OF 4 YEARS ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE	35%
EDUCATION: SAME AS LEVEL I	68%
TRAINING: DEFENSE ACQUISITION AND CONTRACTING EXECUTIVE SEMINAR	3%
MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS (EXECUTIVE)	0%
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION (EXECUTIVE)	3%
ADVANCED CONTRACT PRICING	0%

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 3

used during analysis of the data in Chapter IV. Table 3-12 summarizes the longevity responses and representative positions.

Part 2 of the questionnaire solicits responses on a number of questions concerning the type and extent of interaction with reserve personnel, effectiveness of tasks and duties assigned and performed, and an open-ended "any other issues"

question. The survey questions will be addressed individually.

TABLE 3-12: TIME IN SERVICE/CAPACITY EMPLOYED

CATEGORY	MEAN	MEDIAN	RANGE	REPRESENTATIVE POSITIONS
TIME IN COMMAND	4.2	2.0	1.0 - 12.0	COMMANDERS (DCMAO, DPRO) ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICERS CHIEF, CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
TIME WORKING W/RESERVES	3.3	2.0	.5 - 12.0	CHIEF, MILITARY PERSONNEL MILITARY PERSONNEL SPECIALISTS

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix B), Part 1

Question 1. Please describe your current position and how you interact with the Naval Reservists. Please list any pertinent professional affiliations and certifications, i.e. NCMA/CPCM.

Refer to Table 3-12 for a listing of representative positions occupied by the respondents. The respondents' position descriptions as they pertain to reservists were either obvious from their title or explained by their interaction with the units. The Commanders' interaction with reservists takes the form of Management Action Team participation, planning sessions, and project generation and reporting out. Individuals involved in military personnel management interact with the reservists by coordinating training dates and providing administrative support as needed. They also provide assistance in translating DLA (non-Navy) requirements and policies for new reservists. Contracting Officers and Contract Management personnel interact very little with the reserve units directly, but provide the bulk

of the contract administration taskings (closeouts, termination work, contract controls, reviews, audits, surveys), and generate some project work for accomplishment during AT periods. Likewise, the analysts queried have little direct contact with the units, but forward suggestions for reviews, audits, and analytical research projects to liaison personnel for unit accomplishment. In general, based on the responses to this question, the reserve units operate fairly independently, requiring little contact with their gaining commands aside from periodic assignments, results reporting, and general direction. This is particularly true for units that are involved in long-term, comprehensive type projects. These units know their monthly tasks in advance and, therefore, place very few administrative burdens on their gaining commands.

Question 2. Please list the tasks and duties the Naval Reservists in your area of responsibility are currently performing that you feel contribute most to the mission of DCMD.

This question is directly complementary to Question 4 on the SELRES questionnaire. The purpose of both is to solicit opinion on what duties and assignments performed by the unit provide value to the gaining command. For the purpose of comparison, Table 3-13 summarizes the results of the question in the same format as that used in Question 4 of the SELRES survey (Table 3-7).

The fact that Table 3-7 and Table 3-12 do not agree does

TABLE 3-13: MISSION CONTRIBUTIONS

GENERAL CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE RESPONDING	REPRESENTATIVE TASKINGS
AUDITING/REVIEWS	20%	PROGRESS PAYMENT AUDITS ANALYSIS/RESPONSE TO DCAA AUDITS INTERNAL/EXTERNAL PROCESS REVIEWS
ANALYSIS/RESEARCH PROJECTS/PLANNING	45%	ACCOUNTING SYSTEM DEFICIENCIES PENSION PLAN RISK ANALYSIS OVERHEAD RATE ANALYSIS MANAGEMENT ACTION TEAMS MANAGEMENT INDICATORS ORGANIZATION STRUCTURES ANALYSIS
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION	25%	COST-TYPE CONTRACT CONTROLS CLOSEOUTS TERMINATIONS COMMAND CENTER OPERATIONS
TRAINING	10%	CONTRACTOR TRAINING AND ORIENTATION (QA AND DOCUMENTATION) SMALL BUSINESS PRESENTATIONS
CONSULTING SERVICES	0%	

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix B), Part 2, Question 2

not invalidate either one. The differences are primarily a function of the different commands and positions of the respondents. There was some agreement in responses between particular gaining commands and their affiliated reserve units. For example, contractor training and orientation was one of the primary duties for one unit, and was viewed as providing significant value by both the unit and gaining command.

Question 3. Please list any tasks and duties the Naval Reservists in your area of responsibility are currently performing that you feel do not contribute to the overall mission effectiveness of the DCMD.

This question is a companion to Question 5 on the SELRES survey. Respondents were virtually unanimous in their opinion that there are no tasks currently performed that do not

contribute in some way. Only one respondent answered with a response other than "none," and that was, "I'm not sure."

Question 4. Please list any tasks and duties you are not currently asking Naval Reservists to perform that you feel would enhance their contribution to the mission of the command.

This question is a companion to Question 6 on the SELRES survey. The responses to Question 6 lent themselves to summarization in related categories. The responses received to this question could not be grouped in a like manner since the responses didn't exactly list tasks or duties for the units to perform. Some respondents felt that the question couldn't be appropriately answered without a consensus from the activities that owned and managed the programs or projects involved. Others felt that the question didn't quite address the issue or, more bluntly, was not a meaningful question. Some suggested a better question might have been to determine what factors limit the duties or projects being assigned. In this regard, most respondents mentioned that time, coordination, and communication problems were the major limiting factors to making any significant improvements in the reserve unit's ability to provide value-adding contributory support. Many indicated that they would like to get the units more involved in the routine contract administration, quality assurance, and engineering support functions as a means of reducing backlogs and providing realistic mobilization billet

training. One respondent summed up contribution enhancement as follows:

> In reality, a whole new approach to how Naval Reserve units are utilized in DCMC should be developed. Using Operation Desert Shield/Storm as an example, it is clearly evident that Naval Reserve contract administration personnel mobilization requirements have been diminished. Their activities should focus on tangible long-lasting contributions to the command. The amount of time required to be familiar with the day-to-day issues of various contract administrative functions does not lend itself well to the reserve unit schedule. Therefore, activities should focus on the Command, District, or Area Operations as a whole rather than functional areas. The benefits of this approach are more easily measured. This is extremely important in today's DCMC environment.[5]

This response points to a new and more realistic focus and approach to using reservists, necessitating a change in the billet structure, unit organization, and qualifications requirements. Other respondents also generalized that the present unit structure and focus was not necessarily conducive to providing the types of support and training desired.

Question 5. To what extent do you feel the experience and training requirements of DAWIA should apply to Naval Reservists considering their current duties performed in a reserve capacity, and what they might be expected to do should mobilization be ordered?

This question did not have a companion question in Appendix A. The purpose of this question was to get an idea as to how the "trainers" felt about the issue of DAWIA applicability to the reservists. Most felt that DAWIA requirements are not essential to the mission of the reserve units and shouldn't strictly apply, but could be effectively

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[5]Anonymous response to survey question.

used as a guideline. The duties and projects the reservists normally participate in are rather specific and don't require well-rounded, comprehensive training. The reservists are more often than not assigned projects or duties that make use of their civilian skills as opposed to their military training. Should mobilization occur, most respondents felt that their reservists could become fully trained in short order to fulfill specific surge generated assignments. Table 3-14 summarizes the results of this question.

TABLE 3-14: DAWIA APPLICABILITY

DAWIA APPLICABILITY	PERCENTAGE RESPONDING
DAWIA REQUIREMENTS SHOULD GUIDE TRAINING, BUT NOT BE MANDATORY	22%
TRAIN TO MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS VICE DAWIA REQUIREMENTS	14%
DON'T WORRY ABOUT DAWIA, DOESN'T RELATE TO WHAT RESERVES REALLY DO	42%
NO RESPONSE/NOT SURE	22%

Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix B), Part 2, Question 5

Question 6. Do you feel there are adequate controls in place to prevent conflicts of interest between your Naval Reservist's civilian employment and their duties at DCMD? If inadequate, please indicate suggested controls for future implementation.

This is a companion question to Question 7 on the SELRES survey. The purpose of this question is to assess the perceived possibility of a conflict of interest situation from the viewpoint of the gaining command personnel. Most (94 percent) of the respondents indicated that controls were entirely adequate, six percent were not sure. There were no

responses indicating that controls were considered inadequate. Controls mentioned consisted of the completion of a Confidential Statement of Affiliations and Financial Interests (DD Form 1555), limiting access to files (paper and electronic), and awareness training.

Question 7. Any other issues (positive or negative) concerning Naval Reserve participation in Defense Contract Management?

This question is similar to Question 9 on the SELRES survey and was intended to give the respondents an opportunity to express a thought or raise any issue they felt compelled to voice. Unlike their reserve counterparts, 100 percent of the gaining command personnel took the opportunity to contribute responses to this question. One area in which they were in almost unanimous agreement was that the lack of time was a significant limiting factor in achieving effective utilization of their reserve assets. The following list, in no particular order, is a representative sample of the comments made:

- Reserves should be employed to the fullest, they are a tremendous asset.
- Better communication, permanent facilities, and longer tenures are needed. Longer tenures would be of tremendous value for follow-on reviews and audits. Some Army and Air Force reservists have been in the same billet for over 10 years.
- Unit members should be close geographically to gaining commands.
- Mobilization billet qualification is not particularly critical as the needed skills can be quickly taught should full mobilization occur. Rapid learning is facilitated by the basic knowledge the unit members gain through their projects and monthly duties.

- Don't need Naval Reservists in DCMC!
- Contract closeout is impossible to do on the weekends, most of the team members aren't there.

In summary, responses to both questionnaires tended to be in general agreement with few drastically different comments. This indicates a mild consensus of opinion, and will be the subject of further analysis in Chapter IV. As a closing remark, the rate of response to the questionnaires was not particularly great (24.4 percent returned) considering the high level of stability and cohesiveness of the units involved. However, those who did respond provided thorough inputs.

IV. DATA ANALYSIS/INTERPRETATION

As discussed in Chapter II, the United States has, throughout history, allowed its armed forces to atrophy in times of relative calm, only to find that these same forces must be rapidly reconstituted to meet emergent threats. This scenario is now threatening to repeat itself. Current opponents of a large, strong military are using the current budget climate to demand a significant downsizing of the armed forces with the resulting savings used for domestic programs. While most advocates of the military concede the need to downsize to some extent, they maintain that serious threats presently exist and will continue to be a factor in the foreseeable future. The goal, then, is to downsize in a manner that preserves a level of military might sufficient to deter or meet aggression, while continuing to operate within the constraints of a limited budget. This paper has attempted to show that reserve forces can be viewed as a relatively inexpensive means of maintaining a trained, rapidly deployable force. Additionally, using their skills and experience in providing contributory support, reserve units can partially or completely offset the costs incurred to maintain the reserve program. In an effort to determine future roles for one segment of this force, the DCMC reservists, this chapter will analyze the literature research presented in Chapter II and

the survey data presented in Chapter III to outline a picture of where the units are today, and in what direction they should be heading.

The research and data will be analyzed and discussed in three main sections. First, the experience levels and qualifications of the personnel involved will be examined. Next, the present employment of unit personnel will be looked at with general examples of both effective and ineffective employment presented. Finally, the possibilities for future utilization of the DCMC units and the impact of DAWIA will be examined.

A. UNIT PERSONNEL

One of the central issues in this subject area concerns the qualifications of the individual reservist to perform his/her duties at the DCMD. There are several ways to look at this issue depending upon what tasks the reservist will be expected to perform. Mobilization billet qualification, the certification standards of DAWIA, and the formal recognition and employment of civilian expertise are all factors to consider. First, viewing qualifications primarily in terms of the mobilization billet, the Individual Training Plan (ITP) (Appendix C) precisely outlines the requirements necessary to achieve full qualification. When the reservists complete their ITP, they are considered fully qualified to function in their assigned mobilization billet. How does this relate to

the certification standards of DAWIA and, more importantly, how does this relate to their ability to provide contributory support? Comparing the ITP (Appendix C) with Table 3-11, the reader will note that mobilization billet qualification is approximately equivalent to a Level I DAWIA qualification. Specifically, the ITP lists 13 requirements that must be completed to qualify for that particular mobilization billet. Only requirements no. 11 and no. 13, Management of Defense Acquisition Contracts and Principles of Contract Pricing respectively, correspond to DAWIA certification requirements at Level I. The other 11 items consist of indoctrination, general military training, NOBC qualification, and AT/IDTT completion. For the ranks and seniority involved, Level I is a rather low level of qualification, and may be virtually meaningless depending upon the final outcome of the DAWIA reserve applicability issue. Additionally, from the data summarized in Tables 3-7 and 3-13, it is apparent that the mobilization billets and their qualification standards don't necessarily relate directly to what the reservists provide in the way of contributory support. However, lacking other formal training requirements, mobilization billet qualification does have value in that it appears to provide a basic orientation to the language and processes of contract management. In essence, the focus of any future qualification effort must be determined by the expected primary role of the reserve assets. If the mobilization billet remains the

primary purpose for the unit's existence, then achieving appropriate ITP qualification should be the overriding priority. If contributory support becomes the primary purpose of the unit's existence, then maximum use of the reservist's available time, knowledge, and skills must be made to achieve the greatest contribution possible. This would necessitate deemphasizing mobilization billet qualification as it tends to encumber the reservist for a year or more while completing the ITP. Many of the reservists, individually or by unit, are providing significant contributory support by using their civilian background and skills (compare Tables 3-3 and 3-7). The DCMC is, after all, managing contracts awarded to businesses, and who better to interact with businesses than businesspersons? Chapter II discussed the advisability and precedence for this type of interface. Additionally, Tables 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5 reveal that the DCMC reservists have many years of experience in a wide variety of business (including acquisition) and technical backgrounds, with many achieving relatively high positions in their respective fields. This wealth of experience and skill needs to be utilized. It is an asset that the Navy, or DCMC for that matter, did not have to pay for, unlike the training necessary to qualify under the ITP. Furthermore, individual responses that generated Table 3-4 revealed that over one half of the respondents had some acquisition related experience, either on active duty, with a prior reserve unit, and/or in their civilian pursuits. This

indicates that a large portion of DCMC's reserve assets were already fluent in the language of contracting before coming into their billet. Therefore, they can be put to work immediately using their prior military experience and civilian skills to provide a value-adding service to the gaining command.

In summary, with respect to the qualifications of unit personnel, the following interpretations of the data are presented:

- Reservists affiliated with the DCMD units are highly trained and qualified in their respective civilian pursuits.
- These skills were obtained at little or no cost to the Government.
- Many of these skills can be put to use in directly supporting the mission of the gaining commands.
- The emphasis on future training should be directed at augmenting the skills already possessed by the reservists, and developing those necessary to provide contributory support.

B. PRESENT UTILIZATION

Before proceeding with an examination of the current utilization of reserves, it is important to review how the data were presented. Referring to Table 3-7, the duties/responsibilities reported by the reservists were broken up into five categories with a list of representative taskings cited for each category. Contrary to what would normally be expected from a DCMC reserve unit, contract administration

functions accounted for only 16 percent of the responses. However, closer inspection of the representative taskings listed in the applicable tables reveals that many of the duties listed in other categories are also performed at a DCMD, such as audits, reviews, buy versus lease analysis, pension plan assessments, etc. The reason for this aberration is that the taskings listed under contract administration are duties performed predominantly at a DCMD, whereas, the other taskings may be performed at a variety of organizations or businesses and/or lend themselves to separate classification as they relate to distinct civilian occupations.

As indicated in Table 3-7, reservists are currently being employed in almost as many different positions as there are reservists, with each unit showing a distinctly different focus. Most respondents indicated some satisfaction with their level of present utilization, as did their respective gaining command respondents. The reservists' primary complaint was the fact that Naval Reserve administration consumed too much time (see Table 3-8). The gaining command respondents' primary complaint was that the reservists could not spend enough time with them to be fully utilized. These complaints are, no doubt, related; however, addressing the Naval Reserve administration issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.

It was evident from the responses that the units involved in long-term projects which they had initiated and/or managed

tended to be the most satisfied with their current utilization. Units which were fragmented, with individuals not knowing from month to month what project or task they were being assigned, tended to show the least satisfaction. From the gaining command's perspective, units involved in established, value-adding projects or who performed even routine functional assignments regularly were recognized as important assets to the gaining command. Units that were assigned a wide variety of isolated or unrelated tasks from drill to drill were looked upon as being of marginal utility or even unnecessary by some gaining command respondents. It is also interesting to note that those units which indicated a good working relationship with their gaining command tended to fit into the satisfied category. However, those units which indicated a somewhat strained relationship fit into the less than satisfied category. There was one unit that mentioned an abrupt positive turnaround in relations with the gaining command after they received a new Commanding Officer. The new CO believed that the reserves had value and showed support for the program. A final observation is that there is a high degree of correlation between the units and their respective gaining commands as to their mutual satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

This researcher's interpretation of these responses is that effective reserve asset utilization, now and in the future, must start with the gaining command upper management.

They need to show interest in, and support of, the reserve program before their subordinates will take it seriously and interact effectively with the unit membership. This must be achieved before the units can be of value to the gaining command. Regardless of the skill level and motivation of the reservists, a disinterested or non-responsive gaining command probably will not put the unit to work in a meaningful manner. From another perspective, that of the gaining command, a non-responsive or inefficient reserve unit will most assuredly cause a potentially supportive gaining command to lose interest in the program.

Another aspect this researcher found prevalent throughout many of the responses was the fact that the opportunity to use one's civilian skills, applied appropriately to a functional aspect of contract management, yielded a great deal of satisfaction for the reservists. Auditors who performed audits and reviews, attorneys who worked on legal issues, analysts who analyzed, and software experts who developed and fine-tuned applications all expressed fulfillment and felt they provided a meaningful contribution. Responses from their gaining commands agreed with this assessment. They were impressed with the expertise of the reservists and felt that the most meaningful contributions came about when the reservists used the talents and knowledge that they brought with them to the billet.

In summary, with respect to current utilization, the following interpretations of the gross data are presented:

- Gaining command support is absolutely essential before effective utilization can be obtained.
- Long-term, meaningful projects conducted by units tended to yield greater satisfaction for the reservists, and resulted in greater contributions to the gaining command, than fragmented taskings given on short notice with no clear pattern.
- The greatest utility for both parties was achieved when the reservists were given the opportunity to use their civilian skills, appropriately applied to the Government contract administration function.
- Both parties view time constraints as a major limiting factor in achieving the most effective utilization.

C. FUTURE UTILIZATION

The questionnaires generated a profusion of ideas as to the most effective future use of reservists. Maximum benefits will most likely be the result of combining the best of what they are doing now with the best of what they are or can be qualified to do, tempered by the needs of the gaining commands.

A logical starting point for this discussion is the applicability of DAWIA and its impact upon the roles of the reservists affiliated with DCMC. As discussed in Chapter II, this issue is currently unresolved, but the consensus of opinion in varying degrees (also see Table 3-14) is that DAWIA should not apply to reservists for several reasons. First, few if any reservists have, or could easily attain, the level

of certification required to perform in a billet commensurate with their rank and experience. This is apparent from the results outlined in Table 3-11. Even when all previous military and civilian acquisition experience is taken into consideration (summarized in Tables 3-4 and 3-5), less than half of the reservists can currently be certified at Level I, and maybe one in ten can be certified at Level II. Based on the current ITP, Level I is the highest any reservist will attain unless he/she achieved higher qualifications at previous commands. This limitation is also applicable to the many DCMC reservists involved in Quality Assurance (which is covered separately under DAWIA) as opposed to other contract administration functions. The length of time it would take to achieve Level II certification would necessarily be a function of the background of the individual reservist and the extent to which the gaining commands would be willing to trade off contributory support for mobilization billet qualification.

Second, according to both reserve and gaining command respondents, much of what the reservists will be doing in the future will be more attuned to their civilian background and expertise than on specific Service training and mobilization billet requirements. Table 3-14 summarizes the gaining command responses on this issue. Clearly, they believe that DAWIA is not, and will not, be a factor; therefore, it would be more appropriate to use DAWIA as a convenient guide,

allowing reserve units to concentrate more on training to probable duties and responsibilities.

Assuming DAWIA will not apply to reservists, the next area to analyze is the responses of both the SELRES and gaining command representatives. In general, the SELRES respondents saw little change in how they could be more effectively used in the future from what they are currently doing (compare Tables 3-7 and 3-9). The ones that were actively involved in long-term projects or who performed significant functional duties were content to keep going in that direction. Those that were not consistently employed expressed interest in concentrating on various elements of contract administration in which they, from time to time, were permitted to participate.

In analyzing the gaining command responses, it is interesting to note that they, for the most part, also viewed present utilization (Table 3-13) as satisfactory for the future. The gaining commands were more concerned with the factors that limited future utilization as opposed to any specific suggestions for more effective employment. If the coordination problems could be resolved and drains upon the reservists' time eased, the reserve units could be more efficiently employed doing essentially what they are doing now. It is this researcher's interpretation that their biggest concern was having the opportunity to work with a stable group of reservists for a period of time sufficient to

get past mandatory training and to really get involved in contributory support in either projects or functional areas. It was generally assumed that the likelihood of ever having to recall reservists to their mobilization billets was almost nonexistent. As previously mentioned, only about five percent of all DLA's reservists were recalled during Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS), and most of those were activated because of very specific skills they possessed, not because of their mobilization billet. Therefore, the gaining command respondents sent a strong statement to shift the training and employment focus to providing long-term contributory support by increasing tour length and reducing the non-productive claims on the reservists' time. The SELRES echo these sentiments by referring to the significant time required to perform non-productive Naval Reserve administrative tasks (Table 3-8) and their overwhelming support for a structured acquisition career path (Table 3-10).

In summary, with respect to future utilization, the following interpretations of the gross data are presented:

- There is no logical way to apply DAWIA to reservists, other than to possibly use it as a training guide.
- Lengthening unit tours and structuring a formal acquisition career path are essential to achieving maximum effectiveness and more universal acceptability of reservists.
- Future utilization should concentrate more on contributory support and much less on mobilization billet qualification. Under today's system, the reservists can't provide a return on investment until after they qualify for their billet.

- Future utilization will look much like current utilization, only it will be more concentrated and more structured. Greater consistency will be observed between various units.

As a closing remark, there are several general patterns of agreement that became evident during this analysis. First, most respondents from both sides expressed some level of approval for the reserve program and viewed the contributions provided by the units as adding value; however, this consensus was predicated by the working relationship present between the unit and gaining command. The working relationship is most likely the core of effective employment. Second, most respondents thought there was a future for reserve participation in the DCMC units, but realized that this participation must be cost effective. Justifying reserve expenditures using the mobilization readiness argument is weak at best. Finally, although only a few respondents specifically mentioned it, many alluded to the need for a new approach to managing the reserve program and measuring its effectiveness.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter will present the conclusions and subsequent recommendations based on the previously presented data, analysis, and interpretations. Following this, the primary and secondary research questions will be restated and addressed with respect to the results of this research effort.

A. CONCLUSIONS

1. The reservists currently serving in DCMC units are highly motivated, educated, and experienced individuals that represent a significant asset in an era of constrained resources.

The research has shown that the SELRES officers affiliated with the DCMC units possess significant active duty, reserve, and civilian experience and expertise in a wide variety of acquisition, acquisition related, and general business disciplines. These skills, while not necessarily directly applicable to some or all functional positions at the DCMD unit, can nonetheless be quite valuable to the gaining command if recognized and used properly. Those gaining commands that took advantage of these assets were satisfied with the results and intend on taking full advantage of them in the future.

2. Gaining command approval and support is absolutely essential in achieving effective and efficient employment of reservists.

The research indicated that those units working with gaining commands that actively supported them by recognizing their capabilities and taking their efforts seriously were more effectively employed than those units operating under less-than-ideal working relationships with their gaining command. Although an unmotivated reserve unit can discourage an otherwise supportive gaining command, effective utilization of the reserve unit must start with the upper management of the gaining command.

3. Gaining command personnel and SELRES alike gain the greatest utility when legitimate contributory support is asked of, and provided by, the reserve units.

The research clearly indicated that this was the case and, combined with the unlikelihood of ever having to recall the reservists to perform in their specific mobilization billets, efforts should focus on increasing value-adding contributory support. Several respondents indicated that, should the SELRES be needed in wartime, the experience they have gained through being contributing members of the DCMD team will adequately prepare them for any foreseeable wartime tasking.

4. It would not be advisable to apply DAWIA to Naval Reservists, except possibly as a guide in developing training.

The research has shown that very few, if any, SELRES could attain DAWIA certification at a level commensurate with their rank. Although not requiring SELRES to qualify under DAWIA may appear to be a double-standard, the emphasis on contributory support based more on the unique talents of the individual reservists will justify this stance. However, using DAWIA as a training guide would ensure a common, minimum level of basic acquisition knowledge to facilitate communication and interaction.

5. Naval Reservists' billet tenure is too short for them to achieve maximum effectiveness in the DCMD unit.

The research clearly indicated that short billet tenures was perceived as a significant problem by both the reservists and their gaining commands. Unlike their Air Force and Army counterparts who spend five to ten years with the same gaining command, Naval Reservists usually serve only two to four years in a particular unit billet. This provides little more than enough time to become fully mobilization billet qualified, particularly if the reservist had little or no applicable experience or training prior to transferring into the billet. Contributory support is traditionally reserved until one is mobilization billet qualified. A related problem is the drain on drill time caused by Naval Reserve administrative requirements. On some drill weekends,

the reservist finds that he/she has little or no time left to devote to functional training or contributory support. All concerned would benefit from streamlining administrative requirements.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. An acquisition/contracting career path should be established within the Naval Reserve.

As previously alluded to in this study, acquisition is a very complex and varied discipline. The other Services have grasped this concept and typically leave their IMA reservists in billet for five or more years. This length of tenure allows complete training in the functional areas and permits the development of familiarity with the peculiarities of the individual offices, customers, or positions. Most respondents, both SELRES and gaining commands alike, indicated that a longer tenure in a particular reserve unit, and the acquisition field in general, was most desirable. The only real obstacle is the perception that remaining in one billet, unit, or specialty too long is detrimental to professional development and promotion opportunities. The often stated requirement that senior Supply Corps officers should be "generalists" to be promotable forces reservists and reserve management personnel to rotate incumbents every two to four years, frequently transferring officers to completely different types of units to broaden their professional

experience. Structured acquisition career paths work in the civilian business community and within the other Services. Therefore, a plan to legitimize an acquisition career path with comparable promotion opportunities should be formulated and implemented. This plan should be accompanied with sufficient "advertising" to update attitudes and change perceptions.

2. Establish contributory support as the primary goal of the reserve unit, with attainment of mobilization billet qualifications as a secondary goal.

The research has shown that both parties, SELRES and gaining command alike, recognize the need to make use of all resources and assets, including reservists, in this era of increasingly scarce resources. Both parties also recognize the unlikelihood of ever being recalled to fill their mobilization billets, and, even if mobilization was ordered, both parties maintain that the reservists could step-in and become viable members of the organization in short order. Therefore, the most cost effective and logical employment of reservists is to give them the opportunity to provide value-adding contributions to their gaining commands. As one gaining command respondent succinctly stated, this will require a new attitude concerning why the reservists' exist, and a revised approach to how the units are structured, how training is conducted, and how value and readiness is

measured.[6] Whether or not mobilization billet qualification remains the primary goal, reserve units of the future should, in any case, be capable of justifying their existence through an impartial cost/benefit analysis.

3. Revise ITPs using DAWIA requirements as a guide, and show preference for billet assignments based on previously attained DAWIA requirement satisfaction.

The research has indicated that it would be illogical to attempt to formally apply DAWIA to reservists; however, many respondents and literature sources alike concede that DAWIA does represent a more than adequate guideline for establishing basic training requirements and long-range training plans, and assessing a reservist's qualifications for various billets. By showing preference to individual reservists who have attained a portion of the DAWIA certification requirements, reserve units will not be forced to start training individuals from scratch and possibly disrupting a unit's efforts at providing support. This is not meant to exclude those without prior experience, but with the successful implementation of a structured career path and subsequently longer tenures in billet, there should be no shortage of qualified or near-qualified officers ready to fill the various billets available.

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[6]Refer to p. 62.

C. SUMMARY

This section of the chapter specifically addresses the primary and subsidiary research questions, and offers suggestions for further research based on the findings of this thesis.

1. Primary Research Question.

a. What is the most effective way in which Navy Selected Reserve personnel can be utilized in Defense Contract Management Command reserve units?

Reservists can most effectively be utilized by taking full advantage of their varied skills and knowledge acquired through prior active duty service, reserve assignments, and extensive civilian business experience. De-emphasizing strict mobilization billet qualification requirements, streamlining non-productive Naval Reserve administrative requirements, and focusing attention and resources on providing value-adding contributory support is also a means to this end. This will require a positive attitude and firm commitment from DCMD management, along with a concerted effort by Naval Reserve leadership to reassess the mission of various reserve elements along with eliminating non-productive administrative and general military training requirements that consume precious drill weekend and AT period hours.

2. **Subsidiary Research Questions.**

a. ***To what extent are Selected Reserve personnel currently being utilized in the DCMC units?***

The employment of Naval Reservists varies significantly from unit to unit. Some units are deeply involved in long-term projects, some units disperse members to work with individual functional areas or offices on a routine basis, and other units seem to muddle through from one drill to the next. The predominant deciding factor is the attitude of the affiliated DCMD office with regards to their desire to take advantage of the reserve assets at their disposal. Offices with positive working relationships have their reserve units involved in projects and functional taskings that have reduced administrative burdens for the regular employees. Offices with strained working relationships tend to haphazardly assign projects to occupy their units during drill weekends and AT periods. These projects may, or may not, add value to the organization, but certainly don't provide the return that planned projects and well-thought-out functional taskings provide. A secondary factor in the effective employment of reservists is the attitudes of the unit members and their respective skills and experience levels. Both factors must be positive to achieve efficiency and effectiveness.

b. What functions can Selected Reserve personnel perform that they are not currently performing?

In general, reservists are currently performing most of the functions that anyone surveyed would expect them to perform, now or in the future. The predominant response with regards to this question is not what functions can be performed, but how can more time be allotted to perform the currently assigned functions. This involves eliminating non-productive duties and responsibilities, reorganizing the reserve elements to facilitate their interaction with the gaining command, and reassessing the priorities of the various roles the unit will be expected to fulfill.

c. How will the mandatory training requirements in DoD Directive 5000.52 impact the Selected Reservist's ability to fully qualify for their positions and perform in these billets in the future?

The training requirements cited in DODD 5000.52 are not, and probably will not be, mandatory for the reservists, but should serve as a guide in determining the reservists' mobilization billet qualifications. Current ITPs are roughly in line with Level I certification, and it is not inconceivable to envision at least partial completion of Level II certification for most reservists. How it will impact their ability to perform in their respective billets is currently more a factor of the individual gaining command's employment of their reserve assets.

d. What is the impact of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) on the designation of acquisition billets in the Selected Reserve?

The billets currently occupied by reservists essentially mirror positions filled by active duty or civilian Government employees. However, DAWIA billet designation is rather specific, and, at this point, no reserve billets have been designated as acquisition billets. Additionally, from the sources investigated and reported in Chapter II, it doesn't appear likely that any reserve billets will be so designated.

e. Does the present training and career path within the DCMC units fulfill qualification requirements of other reserve acquisition billets?

The training and career path progression currently offered in DCMC affiliated units will only partially fulfill qualification requirements of other acquisition related reserve billets, depending upon the particular billet the reservist is occupying. The majority of DCMC reserve unit training is focused towards Contract Administration (NOBC 1485) which is only one segment of acquisition. A large percentage of the DCMC billets are also involved in Quality Assurance or other functional areas (NOBCs 7435 and 7445) and may or may not fulfill requirements levied under other acquisition billets. However, despite the fact that the DCMC reservist may not necessarily be able to step into a Naval

Regional Contracting Center or other such unit and be fully qualified, that reservist does possess a rudimentary background in acquisition and is familiar with the various aspects of the field. If a structured career path were in place that allowed officers to migrate from one acquisition billet to another without stopping to become a generalist, it would not take very long before a trained cadre of officers were available that could easily step from one unit to another and be fully qualified from the outset. Under today's push to vary experience, a reservist may serve only one or two isolated tours in acquisition, never quite attaining a level of proficiency.

D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study only briefly touched upon the present and future employment of reserves. In broad terms, this researcher attempted to assess the contributions provided by the DCMC affiliated reservists by looking at their vast and varied experiences, both military and civilian, and the fact that some gaining commands are quite satisfied with the contributions and support the reserves are providing. However, any position taken as a result of this research should be viewed primarily as a point of departure for further analysis as the conclusions were derived from a relatively small sampling. Additionally, the individual nature of each DCMD unit and gaining command may prohibit universal

application. With these limitations in mind, the following specific areas lend themselves to further research:

- A cost/benefit analysis should be conducted to determine if the DCMC affiliated reserve units are providing contributory support to the extent that they are cost effective. If the unit is found to be cost effective, future existence could be justified regardless of any possible mobilization role.

- Investigate the feasibility of restructuring at least a portion of the DCMC reservists into flexible, mobile groups of experts qualified and ready to tackle a variety of problem areas as needed, without regard to mobilization billet training or assignment. This concept, the consulting group approach, was mentioned by several survey respondents as a possible way to fill a specific need for technical expertise.

- Investigate the feasibility of separating the DCMC reservists and units from the Naval Reserve administrative chain of command. This would mirror what occurs when an active duty member is transferred to a DLA command, and would allow units to devote more time to their contributory support efforts.

As long as there are reserve forces, someone will be asking whether or not they are useful or even needed at all. With some units, justification is easy. With others, it will become increasingly difficult to present a convincing case, especially as budgets and manpower resources are forced to shrink. The DCMC units currently fall into this latter category. Only a very few individuals from DCMC units were recalled during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and the end of the Cold War drastically reduces the possibility of a prolonged conflict, the type that would require mobilization of acquisition support resources. To survive in the future,

these units must "hang their hats" on something other than mobilization. The SELRES and DCMC respondents alike indicated that value-adding contributory support that makes full use of the reservist's combined military and civilian expertise is the direction for the future.

APPENDIX A

Dear Fellow Supply Corps Officer;

The purpose of this letter is to introduce myself, and to request your assistance. I am Lieutenant Commander Mike Colesar, a TAR Supply Corps officer currently enrolled in the Acquisition and Contract Management curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. My thesis research concerns the utilization of Naval Reserve personnel within the Defense Contract Management Command. The assistance I request from you is in completing the attached questionnaire.

Part 1 will be used to develop a very general picture of the officer currently serving at the DCMDs. Part 2 will be used to develop a more focused assessment of the skills and experience of officers serving in the DCMD units, and to find out what you really like and/or dislike about your current duties. It also addresses the issues of conflict of interest and your interest in pursuing a more structured acquisition career path.

The Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991 included the Defense Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). It was passed in response to perceived deficiencies in the acquisition workforce within DoD. Among other provisions, it mandates minimum requirements for experience, training, and education for everyone serving in an acquisition position in DoD to be fully implemented by 1 October 1993. The act currently applies only to active duty military and DoD civilian personnel. Part 3 of the survey is designed to see where the individual reservist assigned to a DCMD unit stands in relation to these new requirements.

I have provided a questionnaire, similar in content to the reserve officer survey, for your "active duty counterpart" to complete. Please have the DCMC individual (military or civilian) whom you work with, or interact with to the greatest extend, complete this questionnaire and return to me in the envelope provided. All responses will be kept strictly confidential.

This research is sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, (Research, Development, and Acquisition) (OASN(RD&A)), and is follow-on research to that previously conducted by LCDR Jim Ross concerning utilization of reserve personnel at Naval Regional Contracting Centers. You cooperation in completing this survey is greatly appreciated.

Very Respectfully,

M. A. Colesar
LCDR, SC, USNR
Naval Postgraduate School
SMC Box 2757
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

LCDR MICHAEL A. COLESAR, SC, USNR
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
SMC BOX 2757
MONTEREY, CA 93943-5000

THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE

Part 1: General

Reserve Unit_____

Mobilization Billet_____

Time in Unit_____ Years: Active Duty_____ Drilling Reserve_____

Current civilian occupation_____

(Note: Please use additional paper if required for a complete answer.)

Part 2: Experience

1. Please list all contracting related positions you have held in your capacity as a civilian, active duty officer, and reserve officer; and summarize your duties, responsibilities, and length of time you held each position. Please list any professional affiliations and certifications that apply, i.e. NCMA/CPCM.

2. Have you earned one of the following Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) Codes?

NOBC	Yes	No
1476 - Procurement Management Officer	___	___
1480 - Procurement Contracting Officer	___	___
1485 - Administrative Contracting Officer	___	___

3. If you answered yes to any of the NOBC's listed above, please describe the basis upon which it was granted.

4. Please list the tasks and duties you are currently performing during your IDT/IDTT/AT that you feel contribute most to the mission of the DCMD.

5. Please list any tasks and duties you are currently performing during your IDT/IDTT/AT that you feel do not contribute to the overall mission effectiveness of the DCMD (i.e. any make-work assignments?).

6. Please list any tasks and duties you are not currently asked to perform that you feel you have the requisite experience and skills to perform, and that would enhance your contribution to the mission of the unit.

7. Do you feel there are adequate controls in place to prevent conflicts of interest between your civilian employment and your duties at DCMD? If inadequate, please indicate suggested controls for future implementation.

8. If a structured acquisition career path were available, would you choose to continue to pursue billets in the field? Why or why not?

9. Any other issues (positive or negative) concerning Naval Reserve participation in Defense Contract Management?

Part 3: DAWIA Requirements

1. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) has mandated specific experience, education, and training requirements for all persons serving in acquisition related positions within DoD. They have been divided into three career levels -- Basic Level Development (Level I); Intermediate Level Development (Level II); and Senior Level Development (Level III). Please indicate below whether or not you have met the listed requirements.

Level I Typical Grade -- O1 to O3
Assignments -- Contract Specialist

Experience: One year of acquisition experience **YES**___**NO**___

Education: As of 1 Oct 93 must have a Baccalaureate degree, OR 24 semester hours in any of the disciplines: accounting, business, finance, law, contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial mgmt, marketing, quantitative methods, and organization and management. **YES**___**NO**___

Training:
1. Management of Defense Acquisition Contracts (Basic) (8D-4320 (JT)) **YES**___**NO**___
2. Principles of Contract Pricing (QMT 170 (JT)) **YES**___**NO**___

Level II Typical Grade -- O3/O4
Assignments -- Contract Specialist; Contract Administrator; Contract Cost/Price Analyst; Contracting Officer

Experience: Two years of contracting experience in an acquisition position of increasing complexity and responsibility. **YES**___**NO**___

Education: Same as Level I **YES**___**NO**___

Training:
1. Government Contract Law (PPM 302 (JT)) (All Level II personnel) **YES**___**NO**___
2. Management of Defense Acquisition Contracts (Advanced) (8D F12 (JT)) (If job is primarily **Pre-Award oriented**) **YES**___**NO**___
3. Advanced Contract Administration (PPM 304 (JT)) (If job is primarily **Post-Award oriented**) **YES**___**NO**___
4. Quantitative Techniques for Cost and Price Analysis (QMT 345 (JT)) (If job is primarily **oriented to Cost/Price Analysis**) **YES**___**NO**___

5. Defense Contracting for Information Resources (ALMC-ZX) (If involved in **acquisition of Information Resources**) **YES**___**NO**___

Level III Typical Grade -- O4 and above
Assignments -- Senior Contracting Official; Procurement Analyst; Branch Head; Division Director; Director of Contracts.

Experience: Minimum of 4 years contracting experience in an acquisition position of increasing complexity and responsibility. **YES**___**NO**___

Education: Same as Level I **YES**___**NO**___

Training:
1. Defense Acquisition and Contracting Executive Seminar (2 ER (JT)) (All Level III personnel) **YES**___**NO**___
2. Management of Defense Acquisition Contracts (Executive) (ALMC-B5 (JT)) (If job is primarily **Pre-Award oriented**) **YES**___**NO**___
3. Contract Administration (Executive) (PPM 057 (JT)) (If job is primarily **Post-Award oriented**) **YES**___**NO**___
4. Advanced Contract Pricing (QMT 540 (JT)) (If job is primarily **Cost/Price Analysis oriented**) **YES**___**NO**___

APPENDIX B

LCDR MICHAEL A. COLESAR, SC, USNR
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
SMC BOX 2757
MONTEREY, CA 93943-5000

THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE

Part 1: General

Your Command_____

Sponsored Reserve Unit_____

Time in Command_____ Time Working with Naval Reservists_____

Current Position _____

(Note: Please use additional paper if required for complete answer.)

Part 2: Experience

1. Please describe your current position and how you interact with Naval Reservists. Please list any professional affiliations and certifications that are pertinent, i.e. NCMA/CPCM.

2. Please list the tasks and duties the Naval Reservists in you area of responsibility are currently performing that you feel contribute most to the mission of DCMD.

3. Please list any tasks and duties the Naval Reservists in your area of responsibility are currently performing that you feel **do not** contribute to the overall mission effectiveness of the DCMD.

4. Please list any tasks and duties you are not currently asking Naval Reservists to perform that you feel would enhance their contribution to the mission of the command.

5. To what extent do you feel the experience and training requirements of DAWIA should apply to Naval Reservists considering their current duties performed in a reserve capacity, and what they might be expected to do should mobilization be ordered?

6. Do you feel there are adequate controls in place to prevent conflicts of interest between your Naval Reservist's civilian employment and their duties at DCMD? If inadequate, please indicate suggested controls for future implementation.

7. Any other issues (positive or negative) concerning Naval Reserve participation in Defense Contract Management?

APPENDIX C

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PLAN

E: INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PLAN PAGE: 1

E: SSN: RANK: P/S NOBC:
IC: RESERVE UNIT: DEPT: DIVISION:

C: BILLET TITLE: PROC MGMT STAFF OFCR RANK: LCDR P/S NOBC: 1485/0000
C: ABSC: GAINING COMMAND: DCMD UNIT TYPE: UMUIC:

TSN	DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE	FREQ	POINTS AVAIL	POINTS EARNED	COMP DATE	PLANNED DATE
FAM-000-0022	GAIN CMD & MOB BILLET INDOC INCL SORM/SECURITY PROCEDURES	CNSRF 3502.1A MASTER TRAINING PLAN	ONCE	0	5	___	___
MED-000-0016	BASIC LIFE SUPPORT	AMERICAN HEAR ASSC/RED CROSS	ONCE	5	0	___	___
PQS-000-0466	BASIC DAMAGE CONTROL PQS (FIRST AID & CBR-D ONLY)	NAVEDTRA 43119-2F 108, 109, 215	ONCE	0	15	___	___
ITT-000-0016	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 1) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	___
ITT-000-0016	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 2) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	___
ITT-000-0016	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 3) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	___
ITT-000-0016	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 4) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	___
CIN-495-0483	INTRODUCTION TO CBR-D	CIN J-495-0483	ONCE	0	5	___	___
ATR-000-0261	AT IN MOB BILLET/DFSC/DCASR/ DLA DEP UNITS	DFSC/DCASR/DLA DEP OR EQUIVALENT	2 FY	40	0	___	___
PQS-000-0003	SHIPS 3M PQS DIVISION OFFICER	NAVEDTRA 43241 SERIES	ONCE	10	0	___	___
COR-000-0110	MGMT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS BASIC (ALM-8D-4320)	NAVSUPNOTE 1500 (ALMC)(OCC) PARTS I & II	ONCE	25	0	___	___
NOB-000-1485	NOBC 1485	NAVPERS 15839 SERIES	ONCE	10	0	___	___
MIS-000-0434	PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT PRICING WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB	QMO-170 (JT)	ONCE	25	0	___	___

TOTAL POINTS: 125 35
PERCENT QUALIFIED: 21.9%
IRAD: 60D23
C.O. SIGNATURE: _____

DATE: INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PLAN PI

NAME: SSN: RANK: P/S NOBC:
TRUIC: RESERVE UNIT: DEPT: DIVISION:

RBSC: BILLET TITLE: CONTRACT ADMIN RANK: LCDR P/S NOBC: 1485/
AUIC: ABSC: GAINING COMMAND: DCMAO UNIT TYPE: UMUIC:

REQ NUM	TSN	DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE	FREQ	POINTS AVAIL	POINTS EARNED	COMP DATE	PI
01	FAM-000-0022	GAIN CMD & MOB BILLET INDOC INCL SORM/SECURITY PROCEDURES	CNSRF 3502.1A MASTER TRAINING PLAN	ONCE	0	5	___	-
02	MED-000-0016	BASIC LIFE SUPPORT	AMERICAN HEAR ASSC/RED CROSS	ONCE	5	0	___	-
03	PQS-000-0466	BASIC DAMAGE CONTROL PQS (FIRST AID & CBR-D ONLY)	NAVEDTRA 43119-2F 108, 109, 215	ONCE	0	15	___	-
04	ITT-000-0016	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 1) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	-
05	ITT-000-0016	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 2) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	-
06	ITT-000-0016	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 3) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	-
07	ITT-000-0016	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 4) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	-
08	CIN-495-0483	INTRODUCTION TO CBR-D	CIN J-495-0483	ONCE	0	5	___	-
09	ATR-000-0261	AT IN MOB BILLET/DFSC/DCASR/ DLA DEP UNITS	DFSC/DCASR/DLA DEP OR EQUIVALENT	2 FY	40	0	___	-
10	PQS-000-0003	SHIPS 3M PQS DIVISION OFFICER	NAVEDTRA 43241 SERIES	ONCE	10	0	___	-
11	COR-000-0110	MGMT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS BASIC (ALM-8D-4320)	NAVSUPNOTE 1500 (ALMC)(OCC) PARTS I & II	ONCE	25	0	___	-
12	NOB-000-1485	NOBC 1485	NAVPERS 15839 SERIES	ONCE	10	0	___	-
13	MIS-000-0434	PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT PRICING WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB	QMO-170 (JT)	ONCE	25	0	___	-

TOTAL POINTS: 125 35
PERCENT QUALIFIED: 21.9%
IRAD: 60D23
C.O. SIGNATURE: _____

E: SSN: RANK: P/S NOBC:
IC: RESERVE UNIT: DEPT: DIVISION:

C: BILLET TITLE: ASSISTANT CHIEF RANK: CDR P/S NOBC: 7445/0000
C: ABSC: GAINING COMMAND: DCMD UNIT TYPE: UMUIC:

TSN	DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE	FREQ	POINTS AVAIL	POINTS EARNED	COMP DATE	PLANNED DATE
PAM-000-0022	GAIN CMD & MOB BILLET INDOC INCL SORM/SECURITY PROCEDURES	CNSRP 3502.1A MASTER TRAINING PLAN	ONCE	0	5	___	___
MED-000-0016	BASIC LIFE SUPPORT	AMERICAN HEAR ASSC/RED CROSS	ONCE	5	0	___	___
PQS-000-0466	BASIC DAMAGE CONTROL PQS (FIRST AID & CBR-D ONLY)	NAVEDTRA 43119-2F 108, 109, 215	ONCE	0	15	___	___
ITT-000-0016	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 1) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	___
ITT-000-0017	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 2) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	___
ITT-000-0008	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 3) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	___
ITT-000-0009	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 4) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	___
CIN-495-0483	INTRODUCTION TO CBR-D	CIN J-495-0483	ONCE	0	5	___	___
ATR-000-0261	AT IN MOB BILLET/DFSC/DCASR/ DLA DEP UNITS	DFSC/DCASR/DLA DEP OR EQUIVALENT	2 FY	40	0	___	___
PQS-000-0003	SHIPS 3M PQS DIVISION OFFICER	NAVEDTRA 43241 SERIES	ONCE	10	0	___	___
COR-000-0181	MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS (CC)	ALMC-8D-4320	ONCE	25	0	___	___
NOB-000-7445	NOBC 7445 CERT. BY GAIN CMD	NAVPERS 15839 SERIES	ONCE	10	0	___	___
MIS-000-0437	WORK PLANNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS	AMETA, ROCK ISLAND, CRSE # 7AP21 (JT)	ONCE	25	0	___	___

TOTAL POINTS: 125 35
PERCENT QUALIFIED: 21.9%
IRAD: 60D23
C.O. SIGNATURE: _____

DATE: INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PLAN PAG

NAME: SSN: RANK: P/S NOBC:
TRUIC: RESERVE UNIT: DEPT: DIVISION:

RBSC: BILLET TITLE: QUALITY ASSURANCE OFCR RANK: CDR P/S NOBC: 7435/
AUIC: ABSC: GAINING COMMAND: DCMD UNIT TYPE: UMUIC:

REQ NUM	TSN	DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE	FREQ	POINTS AVAIL	POINTS EARNED	COMP DATE	PLA DA
01	FAM-000-0002	GAIN CMD & MOB BILLET INDOC INCL SORM/SECURITY PROCEDURES	CNSRF 3502.1A MASTER TRAINING PLAN	ONCE	0	5	___	_
02	MED-000-0016	BASIC LIFE SUPPORT	AMERICAN HEAR ASSC/RED CROSS	ONCE	5	0	___	_
03	PQS-000-0466	BASIC DAMAGE CONTROL PQS (FIRST AID & CBR-D ONLY)	NAVEDTRA 43119-2F 108, 109, 215	ONCE	0	15	___	_
04	ITT-000-0016	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 1) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	_
05	ITT-000-0017	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 2) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	_
06	ITT-000-0008	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 3) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	_
07	ITT-000-0009	IDTT AT MOBSITE (PART 4) WITH BILLET OJT	MOB SITE/EQUIVALENT/AS DIRECTED BY GAINING COMMAND	1 FY	0	5	___	_
08	CIN-495-0483	INTRODUCTION TO CBR-D	CIN J-495-0483	ONCE	0	5	___	_
09	ATR-000-0261	AT IN MOB BILLET/DFSC/DCASR/ DLA DEP UNITS	DFSC/DCASR/DLA DEP OR EQUIVALENT	2 FY	40	0	___	_
10	PQS-000-0003	SHIPS 3M PQS DIVISION OFFICER	NAVEDTRA 43241 SERIES	ONCE	10	0	___	_
11	COR-000-0181	MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS (CC)	ALMC-ID-4320	ONCE	25	0	___	_
12	MOB-000-7435	MOBC 7435 CERT. BY GAIN CMD	NAVPERS 15839 SERIES	ONCE	10	0	___	_
13	OJT-000-0281	QUALITY ASSURANCE ORIENTATION SEMINAR (8-D-P21)	DOD 5010.16-C	ONCE	25	0	___	_

TOTAL POINTS: 125 35
PERCENT QUALIFIED: 21.9%
IRAD: 60D23
C.O. SIGNATURE: _____

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